- At 02:25 PM 2/26/2003 , "Ed Siegel" <esiegel@tnl-online.com> wrote:
- A KNOWLEDGEABLE CORRECTION TO THIS SHOW HOW STUPID/COVERING UP/FRAUDULENT THE NRC REALLY IS!
- AGAIN, IT'S LIKE A DAISY-CHAIN: ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE ORIGIN HIV, CAUSING RESULTING AIDS, CAUSING RESULTING DEATH.
- THE ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN IS:
- WIGNER'S-DISEASE/OVERAGEING-EMBRITTLEMENT/OSTWALD-RIPENING/SPINODAL-DECOMPOSITION/"SENSITIZATION"
- (DECIDEDLY NOT SITTING AROUND A CAMPFIRE TOASTING MARSHMALLOWS, HUGGING TREES AND SINGING "KUMBAYA"), BUT GENERIC ENDEMIC MULTI-DECADE LONG-TIME NUCLEAR-INDUSTRY((SO M I S CALLED "SUPER"-ALLOY SUPPLIERS: INCO, HAYNES, CABOT, ELGIN, ...); COMPONENTS FABRICATORS, ARCHITECT/ENGINEERS, UTILITIES/LICENSEES, NRC,DOE (AEC, ERDA,...), EPRI, INPO, NATIONAL LABORATORIES (BNL, ORNL, ANL, LANL, LLNL)
- F R A U D!!!
- Critique inserted into text IN [RED HIGHLIGHTED BOLD ITALICS IN CAPITALS]
- Dr. Edward Siegel
- Metallurgist/Physicist/Whistleblower
- Fired, Westin"KL"ouse Atomic Power Div./Nuc"EL"ar Energy Systems, Senior Metallurgist/Materials Scientist (1974)
- Fired, P. S. E. & G. (N. J. utility), Manager/Metallurgy and Non-Destructive Testing (NDT/E) (1976)
- Fired, I. A. E. A. (by Directors General Eckstrom & HANS BLIX), International Nuclear Metallurgy/Materials Consultant (1977)
- [see: Ana Mayo, "If Leaks Could Kill", The Village Voice, p. 40 (8/21/78); Jnl. of Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)]
- [Do google search on "Edward Siegel" and see especially anti-nuc"EL"ar website www.animatedsoftware.com website and "Alloy 600"]
- (see very end of this document!)
- messages c/o (858) 270-5111
- tat@tnl-online.com
- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- > > > 12 NRC: Immediate order modifying PWR licenses
- > > >
- > > > FR Doc 03-3835
- > > >
- > > > [Federal Register: February 18, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 32)]
- > > > [Notices] [Page 7806-7810] From the Federal Register Online via
- > > > GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr18fe03-81]
- > > >
- > > > NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- > > > [Docket Nos. (as shown in Attachment 1), License Nos. (as shown
- > > > in Attachment 1) EA-03-009]
- > > >
- > > > In the Matter of: All Pressurized Water Reactor Licensees;
- Order Modifying Licenses (Effective Immediately) I
- > > >
- > > > The Licensees identified in the Attachment to this Order hold
- > > > licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
- > > > Commission) authorizing operation of pressurized water reactor
- > > > (PWR) nuclear power plants in accordance with the Atomic Energy
- > > > Act of 1954 and 10 CFR part 50. II
- > > >
- > > > The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) heads of PWRs have penetrations
- > > > for control rod drive mechanisms and instrumentation systems.
- > > > Nickel- based alloys (e.g., Alloy 600) are used in the
- > > > penetration nozzles and related welds [NO, INCO-182/82 TRANSITION-WELD "FILLER-METAL" IS USED; INCONEL-600 IS A WROUGHT ALLOY!!!]. Primary coolant water and
- > > > the operating conditions of PWR plants can cause cracking of
- > > > these nickel-based alloys through a process called primary water
- > > > stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC). [BUT N O T THE ROOT-CAUSE ULTIMATE-ORIGIN, MERELY AN EFFECT, ONE OF SEVERAL EFFECTS POSSIBLE, LIKE LINKS COMPETING TO BREAK A CHAIN. WHICH LINK WINS?THE WEAKEST!] The susceptibility of RPV head
- > > > penetrations to PWSCC appears to be strongly linked to the
- > > > operating time and [AT!!!] temperature of the RPV head. Problems related
- > > > to PWSCC have therefore increased as plants have operated for
- > > > longer periods of time [A.K.A. AGEING, ACCELERATED DRASTICALLY IN OVER-AGEING!!!]. Inspections of the RPV head nozzles [WHY DO THEY CALL THEM "NOZZLES"? A "NOZZLE" IS SUPPOSED TO SPRAY SOMETHING FROM INSIDE SOME SORT OF CONTAINER TO ITS OUTSIDE, THE LAST THINK ONE WANTS WITH A NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL. THE WORD IS F L A N G E!!! OF COURSE, WITH THE VARIOUS "NOZZLE" CRACKING PROBLEMS: DAVIS-BESSIE, TEPCO IN JAPAN, EC(1/14/92 ROLLNICK FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN THE EUROPEAN ,..., IT SEEMS THIS NAME "NOZZLES" FOR FLANGES HAS BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHESY!!!] at
- > > > the Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 2 and 3 (Oconee), in early 2001
- > > > identified circumferential cracking of the nozzles above the
- > > > J-groove weld[INCO-182/82!!!], which joins the nozzle to the RPV head.
- > > > Circumferential cracking above the J-groove weld is a safety
- > > > concern because of the possibility of a nozzle ejection if the
- > > > circumferential cracking is not detected and repaired.
- > > >
- > > > Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler
- > > > and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), which is incorporated into
- > > > NRC regulations by 10 CFR 50.55a, ``Codes and standards,''
- > > > currently specifies that inspections of the RPV head need only
- > > > include a visual check for leakage on the insulated surface or
- > > > surrounding area. These inspections may not detect small amounts
- > > > of leakage from an RPV head penetration with cracks extending
- > > > through the nozzle or the J-groove weld. Such leakage can create
- > > > an environment that leads to circumferential cracks in RPV head
- > > > penetration nozzles or corrosion of the RPV head. In response to
- > > > the inspection findings at Oconee and because existing
- > > > requirements in the ASME Code and NRC regulations do not
- > > > adequately address inspections of RPV head penetrations for
- > > > degradation due to PWSCC, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-01,
- > > > ``Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
- > > > Penetration Nozzles,'' dated August 3, 2001. In response to the
- > > > Bulletin, PWR Licensees provided their plans for inspecting RPV
- > > > head penetrations and the outside surface of the heads to
- > > > determine whether any nozzles were leaking.
- > > >
- > > > In early March 2002, while conducting inspections of reactor
- > > > vessel head penetrations prompted by Bulletin 2001-01, the
- > > > Licensee for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse)
- > > > identified a cavity in the reactor vessel head near the top of
- > > > the dome. The cavity was next to a leaking nozzle [[Page 7807]]
- > > > with a through-wall axial crack and was in an area of the reactor
- > > > vessel head that the Licensee had left covered with boric acid
- > > > deposits for several years. On March 18, 2002, the NRC issued
- > > > Bulletin 2002-01, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation and
- > > > Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity,'' which requested
- > > > PWR Licensees to provide information on their reactor vessel head
- > > > inspection and maintenance programs, the material condition of
- > > > their reactor vessel heads, and their boric acid inspection
- > > > programs. In their responses, the Licensees provided information
- > > > about their boric acid inspection programs and their inspections
- > > > and assessments to ensure that their respective plant did not
- > > > have reactor vessel head degradation like that identified at
- > > > Davis-Besse.
- > > >
- > > > The experience at Davis-Besse and the discovery of leaks and
- > > > nozzle cracking at other plants reinforced the need for more
- > > > effective inspections of RPV head penetration nozzles. The
- > > > absence of an effective inspection regime could, over time,
- > > > result in unacceptable circumferential cracks in RPV head
- > > > penetration nozzles or in the degradation of the RPV head by
- > > > corrosion. These degradation mechanisms increase the probability
- > > > of a more significant loss of reactor coolant pressure boundary
- > > > through ejection of a nozzle or other rupture of the RPV head.
- > > > The NRC issued Bulletin 2002-02, ``Reactor Pressure Vessel Head
- > > > and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Programs,'' dated
- > > > August 9, 2002, requesting that Licensees provide information
- > > > about their inspection programs and any plans to supplement
- > > > existing visual inspections with additional measures (e.g.,
- > > > volumetric and surface examinations). Licensees have responded to
- > > > Bulletin 2002-02 with descriptions of their inspection plans for
- > > > at least the first refueling outage following the issuance of
- > > > Bulletin 2002-02 or with a schedule to submit such descriptions
- > > > before the next refueling outage. Many of the Licensees'
- > > > responses to Bulletin 2002-02 did not describe long-term
- > > > inspection plans. Instead the Licensees stated that they would
- > > > follow guidance being developed by the industry-sponsored
- > > > Materials Reliability Program.
- > > >
- > > > Inspections performed at several [ONLY "SEVERAL"???; HOW ABOUT A N Y / A L L???!!!] PWR plants in late 2002 found
- > > > leakage and cracks in nozzles or J-groove welds that have
- > > > required repairs or prompted the replacement of the RPV head. In
- > > > addition, as discussed in NRC Information Notice 2003-02,
- > > > ``Recent Experience with Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Boric
- > > > Acid Corrosion,'' issued January 16, 2003, leakage has recently
- > > > occurred at some plants from connections above the RPV head and
- > > > has required additional assessments and inspections to ensure
- > > > that the leakage has not caused significant degradation of RPV
- > > > heads. III
- > > >
- > > > Based on recent experience, current inspection requirements in
- > > > the ASME Code and related NRC regulations do not provide adequate
- > > > assurance that reactor coolant pressure boundary integrity will
- > > > be maintained for all combinations of construction materials,
- > > > operating conditions, and operating histories at PWRs. The
- > > > long-term resolution of RPV head penetration inspection
- > > > requirements is expected to involve changes to the ASME Code and
- > > > NRC regulations, specifically 10 CFR 50.55a. Research being
- > > > conducted by the NRC and industry is increasing our understanding
- > > > of material performance, improving inspection capabilities, and
- > > > supporting assessments of the risks to public health and safety
- > > > associated with potential degradation of the RPV head and
- > > > associated penetration nozzles. These research activities are
- > > > important to the long term development of revisions to the ASME
- > > > Code and NRC regulations.
- > > >
- > > > The operating history of PWRs supports a general correlation
- > > > among certain operating parameters, including the length of time
- > > > plants have been in operation, and the likelihood of occurrence
- > > > of PWSCC of nickel- based alloys used in RPV head penetration
- > > >nozzles. Bulletin 2002-02 presented a three-tier categorization
- > > > of susceptibility to RPV head penetration nozzle degradation
- > > > based on reactor operating durations and temperatures. Licensees'
- > > > responses to the Bulletin included an estimate of the effective
- > > > degradation years (EDY) and the appropriate categorization of
- > > > each plant into one of the three susceptibility categories. Each
- > > > Licensee proposed an inspection plan for RPV head penetrations
- > > > based upon the susceptibility to degradation via PWSCC (as
- > > > represented by the value of EDY calculated for the facility). In
- > > > addition, recent operating experience has shown that, under
- > > > certain conditions, leakage from mechanical and welded
- > > > connections above the RPV head can lead to the degradation of the
- > > > low alloy steel head by boric acid corrosion.
- > > >
- > > > Revising the ASME Code and subsequently the NRC regulations will
- > > > take several years. The Licensees' actions to date in response to
- > > > the NRC bulletins have provided reasonable assurance of adequate
- > > > protection of public health and safety for the near term
- > > > operating cycles, but cannot be relied upon to do so for the
- > > > entire interim period until NRC regulations are revised.
- > > > Additional periodic inspections of RPV heads and associated
- > > > penetration nozzles at PWRs, as a function of the unit's
- > > > susceptibility to PWSCC and as appropriate to address the
- > > > discovery of boron deposits, are necessary to provide reasonable
- > > > assurance that plant operations do not pose an undue risk to the
- > > > public health and safety. Consequently, it is necessary to
- > > > establish a minimum set of RPV head inspection requirements, as a
- > > > supplement to existing inspection and other requirements in the
- > > > ASME Code and NRC regulations, through the issuance of an Order
- > > > to PWR Licensees.
- > > >
- > > > It is appropriate and necessary to the protection of public
- > > > health and safety to establish a clear regulatory framework,
- > > > pending the development of consensus standards and incorporation
- > > > of revised inspection requirements into 10 CFR 50.55a, directly
- > > > or through reference to a future version of the ASME Code. In
- > > > order to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of
- > > > public health and safety for the interim period, all PWR Licenses
- > > > identified in the Attachment to this Order shall be modified to
- > > > include the inspection requirements for RPV heads and associated
- > > > penetration nozzles identified in Section IV of this Order. The
- > > > NRC requirements imposed by this Order are based on the body of
- > > > evidence available through February 2003. Continuing research and
- > > > operating experience may support future changes to the
- > > > requirements imposed through this Order. In addition, pursuant to
- > > > 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in the circumstances described above,
- > > > the public health, safety, and interest require that this Order
- > > > be immediately effective. IV
- > > >
- > > > Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o,
- > > > 182, and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and
- > > > the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR part 50,
- > > > it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all licenses
- > > > identified in the attachment to this order are modified as
- > > > follows:
- > > >
- > > > A. To determine the required inspection(s) for each refueling
- > > > outage at their facility, all Licensees shall calculate the
- > > > susceptibility category of each reactor vessel head to
- > > > PWSCC-related degradation, as represented by a value of EDY for
- > > > the end of each operating cycle, using the following equation:
- > > > [[Page 7808]]
- > > >
- > > > [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN18FE03.013
- > > >
- > > > Where: EDY = total effective degradation years, normalized to a
- > > > reference temperature of 600 [deg]F [Delta]EFPYj = operating time
- > > > in years at Thead,j Qi = activation energy for crack initiation
- > > > (50 kcal/mole) R = universal gas constant (1.103x10-3
- > > > kcal/mole[deg]R) Thead,j = 100% power head temperature during
- > > > time period j ([deg]R = [deg]F + 459.67) Tref = reference
- > > > temperature (600 [deg]F = 1059.67 [deg]R) n = number of different
- > > > head temperatures during plant history
- > > >
- > > > This calculation shall be performed with best estimate values for
- > > > each parameter at the end of each operating cycle for the RPV
- > > > head that will be in service during the subsequent operating
- > > > cycle. The calculated value of EDY shall determine the
- > > > susceptibility category and the appropriate inspection for the
- > > > RPV head during each refueling outage.
- > > >
- > > > B. All Licensees shall use the following criteria to assign the
- > > > RPV head at their facility to the appropriate PWSCC
- > > > susceptibility category: High--(1) Plants with a calculated value
- > > > of EDY greater than 12, OR (2) Plants with an RPV head that has
- > > > experienced cracking in a penetration nozzle or J-groove weld due
- > > > to PWSCC. Moderate--Plants with a calculated value of EDY less
- > > > than or equal to 12 and greater than or equal to 8 AND no
- > > > previous inspection findings requiring classification as High.
- > > > Low--Plants with a calculated value of EDY less than 8 AND no
- > > > previous inspection findings requiring classification as High.
- > > >
- > > > C. All Licensees shall perform inspections of the RPV head
- > > > \1\ using the following techniques and frequencies.\2\
- > > >
- > > >
- > > > \1\ This Order imposes additional inspection requirements.
- > > > Licensees are required to address any findings from these
- > > > inspections (i.e., perform analyses and repairs) in accordance