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From: OShirani@aol.com
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Date: Sat, 27 Sep 2003 16:18:59 EDT
Subject: Fwd: G-97-120 GENE 1997 Design Audit Report
To: rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com
Cc: lampert@adelphia.net, dlowryrmb@compuserve.com,
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Mr. Hoffman:
This audit now is a public record, because I included it in my DOL hearring as an Exhibit.
This is the Special Design Audit Report of General Electric Nuclear Energy (GENE) in August 1997 which resulted in a Stop Work Order in August 29, 1997, and was prematurely lifted by ComEd's Oliver Kingsley in November 19, 1997, with disregard with all the code violations. The Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and fuel reprocessing plants, 10CFR 50 App. B. Criteria XVI and XVIII require "prompt corrective actions of deficient conditions" and "follow up and reaudit shall be performed to verify the corrective actions."
ComEd's Oliver Kingsley spitted to all the codes and lifted the SWO with no corrective action from GENE. The lifting of the SWO letter in 11/19/97 had stated "12 times that GENE will do." In addition, ComEd did not verify any of the GENE's corrective action and did not allow me to perform any follow-up audit until May 1999.
ComEd ignored all the warnings in the procurement documents and did business as usual with GENE. This fact was admitted by David Helwig to Kombiz Salehi and Edward Netzel and at the DOL hearing. NRC regulations do not allow any significant deficiencies and safety concerns to remain open for more than 180 days. NRC looked the other way. NRC even started the investigation of my technical allegations a year later and allowed ComEd to switch the issues and my Part 21 issues with other non-relevant issues.
NRC was completely absent in the whole process. NRC's website does not have any documentation to reveal that they performed any inspection at GENE, despite the fact that they immediately notified by my boss, Edward Netzel and other managers who lost their job when Kingsley hired David Helwig from GENE two weeks after he lifted the stop work order. GENE and ComEd falsified the facts from NUPIC and announced in October 1997 NUPIC Meetings that ComEd is satisfied with the GENE's corrective actions and issues were satisfactorily resolved to both parties agreements. ComEd did not allow me to go to NUPIC Meeting and sent Russ Bastyr who became my boss after they terminated my bosses, Messrs. Lon Waldinger, Edward Netzel and engineering supervisor Kombiz Salehi.
This is my 1997 audit report of GE at San Jose, CA which resulted in Stop Work Order, but ComEd hid many significant issues from the report. When You read the body of the report, you will observe the significant issues that I had still documented. These were the same issues that my findings discovered at GE, the largest Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) designer and manufacturer of the world. These issues were found before ComEd/Exelon starting launching the Power Uprate project in 1998 time frame.
According to INPO Reports on August 21, 2002, there were three incidences at Exelon nuclear Power plants, Dresden (BWR), Quad Cities (BWR), and Byron (PWR) from 2000-2002 which resulted in forced outage of these plants. The root cause investigation revealed the cause of the problems and they were identical to the design deficiencies that my audit in 1997 discovered at GE audit that resulted in stop work order. ComEd falsified records of my audit and did not include the calculations that indicated higher stresses found in the analysis.
I found the same issues at GENE in 1997 that caused the major equipment breakdown in the power Uprate incidences at ComEd/Exelon plants in 2000-2002. My case is very similar to Dr. Siegle's case when he found design flaws is Westinghouse tubes before they appeared. The history continues showing that it does not matter how much utilities and NRC try to hide the significant issues from public, the truth will always pop up. NRC is waiting for a physical breakdown or melting of dry cask storage to wake up. NRC does not realize that the material breaking or sign of any crack will only visible when we are completely in inelastic/plastic range when we are way beyond the plastic hinge of the material. In that case, we have exceeded the established design margin by more than 500%. This is the price that people have to pay for the incompetent regulators. In my ASME Papers, I have demonstrated all these material behavior and NRC should go and educate its staff who sent to investigate my audit findings almost two years after my issues were found and the casks were already loaded. NRC did not inspect any of the weld flaws physically (they admitted this fact to Ms. Pamela O'Brien in Atlanta) when she raised allegations to NRC region IV upon reading the short summary of my findings of US Tool & Die audit report. NRC admitted that they went to Holtec in Feb. 2002 to look into only paper documents at Holtec. My findings were identified in June/July 2000 Audit and were documented in my audit report dated August 4, 2000. The same audit that Exelon falsified at the same date of August 4, 2000, and revealed that all findings were closed during the audit.
Dr. Landsman heard about my audit issues in November 30, 2000, when I revealed all the Exelon and Holtec''s cover-up. Dr. Landsman was concerned that Holetc and utility clients especially Exelon from Region III hide these issues from August 2000 until the date of November 30, 2000, when I told him and others.
This is very disturbing that NRC ignored Dr. Landsman who still believes that NRC did not do anything about those issues and did not protect me when he informed NRC in Jan. 2001 which was 9 months before Exelon terminated me with a conspiracy and preplanning games.
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From: OShirani@aol.com
Full-name: OShirani
Message-ID: <192.2036f75a.2ca5cba5@aol.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2003 13:04:37 EDT
Subject: G-97-120 GENE 1997 Design Audit Report
To: coreyjc@flash.net, cjconn@uic.edu
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Corey:
This is a public record. We should extract the significant issues and put it in the Internet. I will work with you. The significant issues identified by my audit in 1997 was falsified by ComEd. These issues were identified prior to the starting of Power Uprate which makes the power uprate more serious safety concern. Especially there were three incidences at Byron, Dresden, and quad cities from 2000-2002 according to INPO August 2002 report which had caused the forced shutdown of Exelon three stated reactors. The identified root cause of the power uprate incidences reveals that these were the issues that my audit identified at GENE prior to power uprate and that was one of the reason that ComEd did not allow me to look into power uprate issues in 1999 when I went for the follow up of my 1997 subject audit.
Oscar
Oscar GENE 97 Audit Report.doc