This valve alignment created a flow path from the Drywell to the Torus, effectively bypassing the pressure suppression function of the torus water volume during a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) condition. This condition placed U2 containment in an unanalyzed condition, not capable of performing the intended design function, which is to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

Corey:
 
This valve alignment created a flow path from the Drywell to the Torus, effectively bypassing the pressure suppression function of the torus water volume during a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) condition. This condition placed U2 containment in an unanalyzed condition, not capable of performing the intended design function, which is to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.
 
Here is my opinion:
Unanalyzed Conditions were exactly the deficiencies that my 1997 Audit of GE, San Jose, CA discovered. During the audit, when we were reviewing the 54 design analysis of reactor vessels and associated components, we found multiple reactor components and structures were not analyzed for the worse loading conditions.
 
ComEd falsified the audit report and removed all the impact statement of the most significant deficiencies of the calculations.
 
If you read even the massaged version of my 1997 GE Audit Report carefully, you still observe the details that the cheaters forgot to hide such as:
 
-     The most severe loading conditions were not analyzed such as SSE (Seismic, Safe Shutdown Earthquake) + LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident)
 
      What this means that For the Boiling Water Reactor types, BWRs (i.e., Dresden, Quad Cities, and LaSalle), this condition was the worse condition that it should have been evaluated and it was not. This was found for multiple calculations.
 
When ComEd instructed the GE to evaluate the most significant audit findings in 24 hours prior to the issuance of the Stop Work Order, GE responded by phone "that all the significant conditions of the cited calculations were evaluated and resulted in some changes in calculations, but it did not render an operability concern."  My team and I never saw the results of those GE documentation to verify that they were truly evaluated those conditions and were truly no operability concerns.  Can you believe what kind of freedom and authority did ComEd allow for the Lead auditor after that audit as mandated by Criterion I of 10CFR50 App. B?
 
I was vividly banned and deprived for two years (August 1997 till May 1999) from going to GE to verify anything, but ComEd's Oliver Kingsley upon his arrival in November 1997, lifted the Stop Work Order in November 19, 1997, without any verification of the cited violations of Codes for 54 design analysis. This was a willful and deliberate violations of 10CFR50 App. B Criteria XVI and XVIII that require PROMPT CORRECTIVE ACTION and FOLLOW - UP AUDIT SHALL BE PERFORMED TO VERIFY CORRECTIVE ACTION. This is a shame that NRC found my allegation in this regard as "SUBSTANTIATED," but did nothing to ComEd nor did NRC perform any follow-up themselves whatsoever as is evident in the response to the FOIA requested by NIRS in 2002. NRC let ComEd to spit on the codes and stayed silent.
 
What is more criminal is that Kingsley hired the same GE person, David Helwig to ComEd a month after he lifted the Stop Work Order with no basis. David Helwig was in charge of all the GE Design Program which was failed 100% by my audit.
  
Helwig shamelessly fired all my managers who had any finger print on the Stop Work Order. This is the land of no law or no order.
 
NRC reminds me of the Chicago high ranking officers who were bribed by Al Capon during the Capon's kingdom.
 
This is the way, Exelon/ComEd and NRC jointly play with human and nuclear safety.
 
History is a good lesson to learn and remember the outcome of Al Capon's life and the those Chicago high ranking officers. I have to go to congress with these facts and expose both players, the Capon and the officers' types for the Human and nuclear safety concerns.
 
Oscar
 
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From: "Corey J. Conn" <cjconn_at_uic.edu>
Subject: Dresden - Valves left open, bypassing pressure suppression
  function.
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Hello Friends,

Corey Comments:  Given that Dresden Unit 2 has GE's Mark I Containment, with the attendent hazards of its "remarkably small volume", I find it worrisome that X-a-Lot would run the thing with the pressure supression completely bypassed for thirty-one hours.  (Check my math and assumptions, please.)


Another Good Day, without the Taste of Metal!
-cjc

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Ref: Power Reactor Event Number: 40311
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2003/20031112en.html

BYPASSING THE PRESSURE SUPPRESSION FUNCTION OF THE TORUS

"On 11/10/2003 at 07:20 CST it was discovered, during a control room panel walk-down, that Dresden U2 had primary containment valves 2-1601-56 Torus Purge valve and 2-1601-21 DW (drywell) Purge valve open simultaneously. This valve alignment created a flow path from the Drywell to the Torus, effectively bypassing the pressure suppression function of the torus water volume during a LOCA (Loss of Coolant Accident) condition. This condition placed U2 containment in an unanalyzed condition, not capable of performing the intended design function, which is to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. The proper valve alignment was restored at 07:26 CST which restored U2 primary containment to operable status per TS (Tech. Spec) 3.6.1.1.

"A review of plant data identified that this valve arrangement, which bypassed primary containment, had been in effect when U2 entered Mode 2 (Startup) from Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) at 12:01 on Nov 9, 2003. In addition, this valve line-up existed for a duration greater than that allowed by TS 3.6.1.1 A.1 and B.1 (1 hour)."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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