Subject: Re: unsubscribe-me-please (action NOT taken)

To: "website email" <>
Date: April 1st, 2004 (this is NOT an April Fools Joke)

To Whom It May Concern,

It is not possible or reasonable to "unsubscribe" the California Energy Committee from my distribution list.  You are exactly the people who need to deal with these issues.  Below is an email responding to my demands for protecting San Onofre from terrorists.  It is imperative that the issues described herein be addressed, immediately.

Please visit my web site for more information about terrorism issues at nuclear power plants.


Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA

Related web sites by this author:

Stop San Onofre:

List of all U.S. nuclear power plants:

Glossary of nuclear terminology:

List of ~400 books, videos, etc. about nuclear power in this author's collection:


From: "Russell D. Hoffman" <>
Subject: I allege...
Cc: California Senators, governor of California
To: Allegations Department, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
From: Russell Hoffman, Concerned Citizen, Carlsbad, CA
Date: January 28th, 2002
Re: I allege...

To Whom It May Concern,

While searching the NRC web site for useful information for my NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN AMERICA web page, which can be entered from here:

...I found this page, which has a lot of information I had been having trouble finding:

But I noticed our lists have a number of significant differences.  The main difference is yours doesn't give several important facts, while it could easily have done so, while mine doesn't give several important facts because it is very difficult to get these facts from the companies and government agencies involved.

For example, your list doesn't have any indication whatsoever of the radioactive content ("burden" would be a better word) of each nuclear power plant and its spent fuel pools, dry storage casks, etc..   Mine does.  Yours doesn't say where the effluent from a meltdown would travel -- down what river, or downwind in which direction?  Mine has the beginnings of this information and I'm searching for the rest.

Your list doesn't say what spent fuel storage system the plants are using.  Yours doesn't link to the company web sites.  Yours doesn't link to activist's web sites, either -- and probably never will.  Mine does all these things.

I noticed that the capacity factors you present start in 1994.  Have you been unable to find earlier figures, or are you embarrassed to display them?  It's common knowledge that the NRC has been allowing the plants to run hotter and at higher pressures lately, despite the fact that as they age they are becoming more and more embrittled and thus, more fragile.  And you've been letting them continue to run despite more and more faults along the way, such as by increasing the repair time allowed for reactor emergency diesel generators before a shut-down would be required.  Other problems the NRC ignores include plant employees who repeatedly lie to the public, (and especially, lied immediately after 9-11 when they (along with the NRC) tried for a while to claim the plants could withstand a similar attack).  Also, your on-site inspectors (who have managed to replace EPA, OSHA, Cal-OSHA, and who-knows-how-many-other state and federal regulatory agencies) couldn't care less what happens outside the "nuclear area" (like, if an 80,000 lb crane falls 50 feet in the turbine room, it is ignored).  Also, your regulatory environment won't even punish, let alone shut down, a plant that's run by people stupid enough, or incompetent enough, or careless enough to leave their Primary Containment Vessel inoperable for 30 years (i.e., since the plant was built) because no one noticed that 32 shipping bolts were never removed from eight large bellows, preventing their use if the moment ever came when they might be needed.  (I was told by a high-level NRC employee that I would be notified if a fine was imposed, but, to date, I have not been.)

Taking all this loosening of what little regulatory oversight there ever was, in the industry that brought us Three Mile Island and a million smaller spills, it's no wonder capacity factors have gone up lately.  If you turn a blind eye to everything, the plant owners make a lot more money and the capacity factors go up. But is that a good thing?

No, it's a very bad thing, actually.

One more point about these "capacity factors" presented in your chart, which are given in percentages.  I noticed that many of the capacity factors go above 100%.  Several are above 103% and one reactor (Surry 1 in Virginia) has a capacity factor one year of 104.4%, and twice since 1994, had capacity factors above 100%.  (There's no indication to tell me if the numbers go up or down, that is, if 1994 is at the top or the bottom of the list, so I'm not sure which years are which.)  So what exactly is the "capacity factor" based on?  I've heard various pro-nuclear spokespeople and ranters claim capacity factors are now around 90%.  But based on what baseline?  Certainly, not a safe one!  (Surry 1's overall capacity, even if 100% is "baseline", doesn't appear very impressive (or even as good as Surry 2, which never went above a 100.1% "capacity factor" in the years indicated.)

I allege that inclusion in the nuclear power plants chart at the NRC web site of the average capacity factors only since 1994 was done specifically because those capacity factors are higher than they were before 1994.  But this increase has been at increased risk, such as less than a year ago when San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station had a record 31-day refueling cycle, and then the day they got back online, a fire and explosion caused a four-month outage, which was followed, the day the unit went back online, with the afore-mentioned dropped load incident.

I further allege that rushing the refueling cycles in order to increase the capacity factors has led to accidents and near accidents, such as when an operator at San Onofre, inattentive perhaps due to long hours, banged a fuel assembly into the reactor vessel while withdrawing it from the reactor.  That was in 1997.  There should be two people on the kill switches for all fuel moves, sort of like in airplanes during takeoffs, when both the copilot and the pilot both put their hands on the throttle, so that the right thing is sure to be done.  All nuclear fuel lifting devices should have multiple kill switches so that accidents become orders-of-magnitude less likely.

Attached below is a piece of poppycock I received from one of your contractors as a response to my list of "25 simple ways a small group of suicidal terrorists could melt down a nuclear power plant and kill millions of people".  The responses are pretty ridiculous.  Half his explanations actually just say that IF the licensees tried, they could protect against such a threat, or IF the military tried, THEY could protect against it.  But unmentioned is that neither are trying to protect against these sorts of threats.  Half his other answers are just absurd.  That leaves about a quarter of his responses, which are all inappropriately minimized without any proof or citations presented to back up the author's claims.

For example, your contractor dismisses my suggestion that mortars could be successfully lobbed at a nuclear power plant because, he says, mortars are not "one shot, one kill" weapons.   Let me explain how mortar shells work.  This description is from a man who's one of my personal heros.  He fought in World War Two as a mortar man (infantry) and forward observer, first in Italy, then in France and on through Belgium and into Germany, including a stretch of 154 days of straight combat.  He experienced the terrifying attacks during the Battle of the Bulge, and took part in the relief of General McAuliffe's besieged troops in Bastogne.  In total he fired the mortar thousands and thousands of times, defending America:

"Now, you understand that a shell doesn't have to hit you to kill you...Shrapnel consists of whirling pieces of the shell itself that has exploded, a jagged piece of metal maybe an inch long and a quarter of an inch wide, like a piece of a pencil, but it's steel and it's spinning, and if that were to hit you . . . For example, if it were to hit your leg it could take your whole leg off because of the momentum and the speed with which it's spinning.  The fragments from shrapnel are terribly, terribly dangerous, and they go for a long distance... And your helmet doesn't really stop it; nothing stops that stuff, except being underground."  (pp 93-94.  Full citation below.)

Also, note these comments:

"A 4.2 mortar would shoot about a mile, as I recall.", and "Two guys can fire a mortar.  One can fire a mortar if he has to... I remember spending about half an hour firing off fifteen or twenty shells all by myself"  (Same author, p. 166.  The reason this was being done (lone men firing mortars) was because of "bad lots" of ammunition supplied by unscrupulous weapons manufacturers.  The authors cite an article in the New York Times, July 24th, 1946 about a Senate War Investigation Committee's findings.  Also see NY Times articles from July 25th and Aug. 9th of the same year.)

If, as it is suggested by the author of the rebuttal to my "25 simple ways" document, we are safe from mortar attacks because they are not "one shot, one kill" (sometimes, anyway), here's a description, again from the same WWII soldier's recollections book, of a "recoilless rifle":  "This thing had cross hairs, a telescope, everything ... I'm standing right beside the guy, and he fires it ... out of the tank jump three or four Germans [who] run into the woods over there.  He knocked it out with one shot."  (pp. 118-119).  That was in the early 1940's and tanks, even back then, were heavily armored (though not with Depleted Uranium like they use today).  Today's weapons, with their sophisticated sabots to keep the pressure up as the bullet leaves the gun, and with their computer-designed shells and barrels, and with laser, GPS, and fiber-optic targeting capabilities, are even more deadly, more penatrating, and more accurate.  But mortars would probably be good enough anyway.

The above book quotes are from: "Archives of Memory: A soldier recalls World War Two", by Alice M. and Howard S. Hoffman (Univ. of KY Press, 1990).  Dr. Howard S. Hoffman, the soldier-author, is now an emeritus professor at Bryn Mawr University.  He is also my father.

Here's a description of the effects of larger weapons, by Dr. Bennett Ramberg in his seminal work on the subject of nuclear reactor vulnerabilities:  "The energy release of [conventional bombs, rockets, and artillery] is a function of their composition and the shaping of the charge to perform specific tasks.  A 100-lb. general-purpose bomb can penetrate more than 2 ft. of concrete and 4 in. of steel.  Since its power is proportional to its size, its 2,000 lb. counterpart can pierce more than 11 ft. of concrete and up to 15 in. of steel.  Heavy, shaped charges are even more effective.  An 800 kg (1,700 lb.) conical-shaped munition 89 cm in diameter and 1 m long with a steel liner can penetrate 10 m of concrete.  Under development are even more effective munitions that are able to penetrate concrete or armor before releasing their main energy.  In addition, artillery exists that can fire rounds over 20 mi. and pierce 5 ft of concrete.  Therefore some munitions are currently capable of destroying even the hardest containments now in existence, although the number of strikes that would take full advantage of each facility's vulnerability cannot be well established on the basis of available data."  (Ramberg, "Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy:  An Unrecognized Military Peril" (Univ. of CA Press, 1980), pp. 64-66.  For this paragraph Ramberg cites Tom Gervasi, "Arsenal of Democracy: American Weapons Available for Export" (New York: Grove Press, 1977), p. 170, and Cecil I. Hudson and Peter H. Hass, "New Technologies: The Prospects,", in Johan J. Holst and Uwe Nerlich, "Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: New Aims" (New York, Crane, Russak, 1979, p. 128.)

The New York Times, in a recent editorial, reminded the public that the containment domes at Indian Point are only three feet thick on the top, some other sources have said that the tops of some containment domes are even less thick than that.  And the sides of even the thickest containment domes are only about 8 -10 feet thick at their thickest point.

Spent fuel pools and dry casks are far less protected and in some cases are hardly protected at all.

If you go onto the Marine military base at Camp Pendleton, California, which surrounds (except on the ocean side) San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, you'll find some very large guns.  It's an "open base" meaning just about anyone can go there (it may have tightened security somewhat since 9-11; I visited the base with a friend and former Navy Seal for a bike tour last summer).  There is an interesting outdoor museum on the base, consisting of some acquired Vietnamese heavy artillery.  Reading the inscriptions, one learns that in the attack in which the weapons were captured, the North Vietnamese soldiers fired about 10,000 rounds from about 10 guns, but they barely touched the Marines who attacked them and took the guns, because the NV soldiers hadn't been properly trained.  Well, that's yesterday's war.  The terrorists will be properly trained next time, you can be sure of that.  Or didn't you learn anything on 9-11?

Also, near the San Onofre nuclear power plant is a public camping area where an armored vehicle designed to look like a family camper could park and lob mortar rounds into the plant for who-knows-how-long.  With, say, 200 or 300 assault weapons, some hand grenades, a rocket launcher, tear gas, and 5,000 rounds of ammo (hardly an impossible number of weapons to obtain, you'll have to agree now), you could hold off an attacking army for quite some time as you lob in mortar rounds on the plant.  And you might not need to defend your position at all, because, by the time the first mortar lands, another is already in the air, and soon, another one after that.  One person can fire a mortar round every minute or two, and four people using several mortars could fire a round every few seconds.  As many as four to six could already be in the air before the first ones have landed!

Then the ground assault begins, of course, just in case the Spent Fuel Pool isn't drained and burning yet.  If there are Dry Casks, a suicidal ground assault team could ensure that they have been knocked over and cracked open.  Frankly, no terrorist is likely to bother with the containment dome and its reactor vessel of uranium when there are much bigger quantities of radioactive materials available for dispersal outside the domes.  And once the facility has been blown to smithereens anyway, a meltdown is probably only minutes away at best, perhaps a little longer, perhaps only seconds away.  But with all the control equipment, fire suppression equipment, coolant systems, etc. all busted up and permanently non-functional, I'd have to say that the situation would be very grave indeed, even without a meltdown of the core.  Thousands would be dead and millions would be doomed to cancer, leukemia, and birth defects.

Are we going to trust the lives of millions of people to the accuracy and determination of our enemies, or are we going to take the pro-active steps necessary to eliminate the targets, and thus the danger, from our midst?  Renewable energy is cost-effective and proven technology, and not vulnerable to terrorism.

I allege that the NRC has a responsibility to shut down all nuclear power plants in the United States IMMEDIATELY.  Failure to do so is a dereliction of duty and a grave danger to the public.

I further allege that you would be willing to hire Scott Waddle despite his record at the helm of a pair of nuclear reactors, because he's got the one qualification you adore -- he's from the Nuclear Navy, and I further allege that your employee Charles Marschall lied to me in June and that it is well-known at the NRC that he did so with impunity.


Russell D. Hoffman
Carlsbad, CA

Included below is the complete letter from Joseph Paez, Global Security Consultants, which I presume was commissioned by the NRC in some way, shape or form.  I know I didn't commission it because if I had, I'd be demanding my money back and I'd fire the corporation that would offer such trash as if it were a reasoned, scientific, technically responsible answer.  But that's just me -- I realize the NRC has never been swayed by facts and isn't likely to start now.  Many scientists have told me they have resigned themselves to believing that only a major accident, with the accompanying pain, misery, and expense, will change your minds about what you are doing.


Mr. Hoffman,


Thank you for your concerns over the vulnerability of the San Onofre Nuclear power plant. As a citizen of California I understand your feeling of insecurity. As a member of Global Security Consultants, I assure you the efforts we are currently undertaking with some of the nations largest nuclear power facilities will all but make your issues mute. I ve attached a word document with our responses to your article, "25 simple ways terrorists could destroy San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and make SoCal uninhabitable for many millennia -- have a nice day, I hope our responses will help ease any feelings of vulnerability you may be experiencing.


Thank you,


Joseph Paez

GSC Inc.


I have read the below comments and have provided feedback where warranted on many of the points this writer makes. I have not yet figured out if he wants increased security for Air Travel, Nuclear Sites, Department of Transportation or just doesn't want power at all that is nuclear derived for some reason. But either way his comments below while many are quite far fetched hold some merit. Those that do hold merit are also addressable, and have been addressed by numerous Nuclear Facilities that Global Security Consultants, Inc. have had the opportunity to work with. We have found that many Nuclear Facilities are not just concerned with passing given requirements but are truly concerned with insuring the safety of the populace around their given areas of operation. Utilizing all Special Operations contractors (U.S. Green Berets, U.S. Delta Force Counter-Terrorism Unit, Army Rangers etc.) GSC has been able to assist these plants by providing answers to not just the types of questions given below but numerous other questions pertaining to adversary capabilities and strategies vs. defensive responses and physical security measures to contradict these elements. I would also like to offer our number and web address to anyone that would see discrepancies in our responses below, and would like to question us on there relevancy.

Phone: 1.877.GSC.2235

Sincerely, Eric Wilson - Director Business Development, GSC, Inc.

1) Hijack a commercial jetliner ala WTC/Pentagon/PA disasters.? If
one isn't
enough, hijack two.? If two isn't enough, hijack ten and be sure.

Nuclear Facilities located by airports are working with the FAA to minimize and address this issue. This is in addition to the FAAs elevated security measures. See number 19 below.

2) Rent, or even buy, a corporate jet so no pesky passengers can take
the cockpit like what happened in PA.? It would do plenty of damage,
if not
quite as much as a jumbo jet.? If one isn't enough, rent two...

Nuclear Facilities Containment buildings were designed to withstand a
direct hit from a commercial airliner. A smaller airliner, while producing some exterior structural damage, would not sufficiently damage the containment building which houses the reactor vessel and thus not resulting in a meltdown.

3) A boat-bomb or depth-charge-carrying boat could be maneuvered over
outflow tubes from the plant, which are each over a mile long and are
on navigation charts so that people don't drop their anchors on them.?
Destroying them would destroy San Onofre's ability to cool itself.?
tunnels may also be vulnerable to collapse when the waters recede
just prior
to the arrival of a tsunami (as they always do), an effect the NRC
did not
ever investigate despite professional advice that they should.)

Plant cooling capabilities are redundant, a boat carrying explosives
1) Will not necessarily damage the piping under the water, depth of piping and size of charge both have to be taken into consideration. 2) Even if a charge was placed directly on the piping it would have to be at a point above the water level or between the pumps and the plant, i.e. a charge placed out in the water randomly on a pipe approximately 20' below water level will just create a hole and another source of feed water into the pipe, 3) There are multiple on-site feed-water systems to accommodate the failure (whether mechanical or deliberate) of this initial feed water system to safely shut down the site. 4) There are also cost effective means of deterrence available to minimize an effective waterborne insertion by an adversary.

4) Steal a tank (as a depressed ex-soldier did in San Diego a few
back) and ram it through the gate at San Onofre.

While this is an unlikely possibility, even if it were to happen, as in the above example, an inoperable tank could do little to cause an act of radiological sabotage. It could cause sufficient exterior damage but do little to the containment building itself that houses the reactor. This is assuming that the Nuclear Facility does not have sufficient or correctly placed vehicular barrier capabilities, which when deployed correctly can effectively eliminate this type of threat.

5) 50-caliber machine gun bullets would penetrate the coolant pumps,
pipes, the control-room, etc.? You can bicycle up to the plant with a
machine gun in a kiddie trailer, or simply stop your truck on the
(I-5) which runs past the plant, and blaze away.? You could get
thousands of
rounds in before anyone could stop you.? Sure, you might not start a
sequence which results in a catastrophic meltdown if you just start
without knowing your target well.? But then again, the large front-
aerial photo of the plant which was published yesterday in the North
Times should give you more than enough information to aim at the most
vulnerable sections.

The validity of this scenario actually causing any type of radiological
sabotage is virtually nonexistent. Lets assume that someone did have a .50 caliber machine gun and opened fired on the plant. The aerial photo would be useless in that you can only fire Line of site (LOS) with the .50 caliber, and the equipment that is displayed in this type of photo will not be things such as the control room etc. If this adversary also had insider assistance to be able to pinpoint the location of critical areas within the varying structures, the .50 caliber would still not be effective against the structural design of most of the protected area buildings (3'reinforced concrete and in some cases an additional 1/4" steel liner).

6) Until just recently the NRC published the GPS locations of the
plants to
6 decimal places.? (That web page has been taken down since September
2001.)? Terrorists could target a cruise-missile against the plant,
or a
ballistic missile, using these values.? A well-aimed ballistic missile
wouldn't even need a warhead.? It's kinetic energy would be enough to
destroy the plant.? And removing the locations from the web site is
window-dressing at best, since the plants are kind of hard to hide in
real world.? Just ride by on your bike and get the necessary
with your portable GPS.

Are we to open the realm of any possibility and require no parameters?
Obviously this is a farfetched grasping scenario. I will also assume that we should not leave the house or travel in our cars at least not without certain protective equipment to protect against the inevitable threats that we may run into. Because don't forget that our personnel information is also available out on the market. Maybe a reinforced roof on the house and car, should be implemented in the event of a stray meteor?

On a more realistic note even if in the future we were in a scenario where our forces could not effectively deter this type of assault on America prior to cruise-missiles entering our airspace, Nuclear Facilities would be just one of many targets, and not because the enemy wants to create a melt down and kill thousands of people, because this would not happen, but because they would be targeting our entire infrastructure (which includes many more and potentially more advantageous targets) attempting to deter us from effectively responding in a period of war.

7) Throw a short-circuiting-bomblet or grenade at the switchyard and
electrical areas of the plant.? This would render it useless and
could cause
a meltdown as well.? (A "short-circuiting-bomblet or grenade" is a
device that contains not shrapnel but long wires which criss-cross the
target's electrical cables and short everything out.? NPPs need
reliable off-site power to run, or they must use their emergency
diesel generators (which often don't start properly when they are
and can also be shorted out along with the rest of the station).?
Yes, these
bombs exist and we used them in Kosovo.)

Nuclear Facilities operate within the assumption that they will lose off-site power during all of the NRC and in-house security scenarios and drills that they run. This also includes protecting and responding to adversaries that attempt to breach the protected area perimeter and make their way to the diesel generators, which would require more than the "bomblet" described above. It would require a significant amount of explosives to incapacitate the Generators themselves and lets assume that the Security Force could not intercept the adversary prior to them reaching the Generators, the adversary could still not effectively complete it's mission. They would need to take out multiple diesel generators and in most cases even a tertiary power supply system.

8) Replace various pages of the control-room operating manuals with
that contain misinformation so the operators do the wrong thing
sooner or
later.? (Requires one inside person; could be done years before the
occurs.? It could already have been done at numerous NPPs and we just
know it.)

Senior Reactor Operators or SRO's are required to go through extremely
intense classroom as well as simulator training to gain the knowledge that they bring to the table. They are not just drones that unthinkingly follow what they see on paper. These procedures are utilized in assisting the Operator at conducting his/her job and are reviewed for correct revision letters prior to use. The chances of a procedure that once followed kicks of a scenario that could create a meltdown by itself is unrealistic. In the unlikely event that the procedure was not questioned before hand, once implementation started multiple alarms would alert the operator of other than normal conditions prior to any catastrophic result.

9) Get an insider to do something.? Insiders have access to many
vital areas
of the plant.? There are thousands of workers at each plant.? Some are
always disgruntled about one thing or another.? And some might
say things at a party or somewhere, which others can use.

Nuclear Facilities have implemented a fitness for duty program which
constantly observes appropriate behavioral characteristics, as well as in depth background checks are conducted on all employees. Even if this were not enough, an active insider bent on destruction would have minimal capabilities. It is not as if you can switch a single switch and a core meltdown occurs. You would need to perform a number of different tasks in conjunction with one another to achieve this effect. And lets not forget other people also monitor this equipment so it would not be able to happen in a vacuum and Nuclear Facilities do sport a heavily armed Security Force.

10)? Derail a high-speed train off its tracks, which go by only about
100 to
200 feet away from the plant.? With a little care and a bit of luck,
train could actually be driven towards the plant by weakening the
rail on
the plant side so the train falls towards that side.

See number 4 above. Also redundant vehicular barrier systems when deployed correctly at Nuclear Facilities will assist in deterring the trains approach.

11) Derail or blow up a chemical train on the tracks nearby.? Such an
accident would probably kill everyone at the plant, which would
lead to a meltdown.

This would probably not lead to a meltdown even if it did result in the
death of everyone in the area. Once everyone dies the plant will not
immediately meltdown, in fact it could be days before issues arise. And
with the above scenario lets not forget that many plant personnel are
located in areas which are designed not to let steam or gases out into the environment which will obviously effectively keep the same out. And of course one more point, the chances of a train carrying an airborne chemical gas killing everyone is not truly guaranteed, a lot of things need to be taken into account i.e. type of chemical, wind direction, etc.

12) Mortars can be lofted into the plant from miles away, including a
highway rest area, a state park, or from the Interstate itself.? One
call these a "drive-by war."

This scenario is a little more realistic. Though there are measures that security forces can take to minimize this threat. i.e. random patrols of the area etc., any adversary that chooses to use mortars will need to recon the area and set up a position. Random Patrols can make this very difficult. Shooting from the back of a vehicle while on the interstate is not very feasible. Mortars are not a one shot one kill type of weapon, in most cases they require multiple shots to acquire target or achieve the desired effect. One mortar would not do enough damage to the facility.

13) Crop-duster planes can be filled with gasoline instead of
then the pilot simply turns on the vents in the final second or two
impacting the plant.? The fireball would be tremendous.

This size of the plane as well as the fireball created would not sufficiently create the magnitude of damage required to create a meltdown.

14) Rent a piece of construction equipment such as a Caterpillar, and
aim it for the control room and let it roll.? Even if they kill the
they probably can't stop the vehicle.

Again see number 4 above. As well with properly placed vehicular barrier redundant systems this threat could be eliminated.

15) Rent a truck and fill it with explosives (as Timothy McVeigh did
Oklahoma City).? There are not nearly enough perimeter controls to
this.? Although the gates appear to be guarded, there do not appear
to be
nearly enough physical barriers, especially for a delivery truck
which has
already made it past the perimeter on false pretences.? (Even the
soda machines need someone to come in with enough materiel (in cans,
cannot be x-rayed) to blow the place to smithereens.)

This scenario is easily avoidable with the proper training given to
Security Force Members on vehicular searching techniques as well as with the implementation of various explosive detection systems that can be deployed at the gate. Combine this with effective vehicular barrier
capabilities and you can minimize this risk.

16)? Use two vehicles -- one to draw away the limited number of
guards at
the plant, the other, which arrives a few seconds later from a
direction, actually does the damage.? A motor home at the state beach
could be filled with terrorists who could take over the control room.

This scenario is also avoidable utilizing the correct and properly deployed vehicular barrier systems. These systems would need to be redundant and have remote control capabilities from not only the guards location but also from the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). A trailer full of terrorist entering the plant even if outnumbering the guard force on site can be effectively deterred from there desired intent, by a well trained guard force and a variety of physical systems and barriers in place. For example, if you create delays for the terrorist element before they enter and once in the protected area, you can strategically position the Security Force to effectively engage the adversary. There is much that goes into determining the appropriate physical systems and barriers that will give you the required delays such as calculating charge size, breach times etc. Many Nuclear Facilities today are looking at exactly this with GSC to enhance security.

17) Steal some of the military training equipment on the base at Camp
Pendleton.? This writer rode his bike over 20 miles on that military
four months ago without being questioned or stopped, along with an ex-
Seal.? We did not realize the significance of our sojourn at the time.

Adversaries stealing equipment or purchasing it is irrelevant, Nuclear
Facilities assume the adversary will be armed with explosive capabilities when looking at their security plans.

18) Get an insider in the U.S. military to attack the plant with an A-
Warthog or Apache helicopter.? This isn't as far-fetched as it may
sound.? A
few years ago a distraught A-10 Warthog pilot suddenly veered off
from his training mission, and flew 800 miles before running out of
gas and
crashing into the side of a mountain.? He carried four 500-lb bombs
at the
time as well as machine-gun ammunition.

Don't forget all the other soldiers and Americans that work in, or on
numerous other Department of Defense (DOD) equipment, i.e. C130's, missile programs etc. If you got enough together you could take out certain states at a time.
- Not Applicable

19) Since there is not a no-fly zone around the plant, any plane that
attacks it gets a free ride all the way in. No one can challenge a
which has not sent an "I have been hijacked" signal and which is
flying in
legal airspace.? The nearest civilian airport is about 10 miles away,
about 5 minutes away for even the slowest airplanes.? Our military
could not
possibly react in time.

This is again a scenario that has to have parameters. Some solutions that Nuclear Facilities have been working on with the FAA is to insure that passengers stay in their seats when flying over nuclear plants that are near airports. If this does not happen then the pilot would alter course until the passenger is back in his/her seat. 

20) Besides dropping depth-charges on the outflow tunnels (see item
"boat-bombs"), you could maneuver a boat very close to the plant,
which is
located at the ocean's edge, and shell the plant from the boat.?
There are
numerous civilian harbors, beaches, etc. near the plant.

There is the ability to deter boats from critical waterborne approaches to the plant site, these systems can be very cost effective and easily
deployed. Utilizing a mortar system from a boat would pose the same
problems as listed above (#12) as well as the added problem of instability for the mortar itself when located on a boat in the water.

21) Multiple small planes can attack the plant at one time,
even a sophisticated air defense system.

Multiple small planes will have little effect on the vital equipment that is contained within the 3' and in some cases 5' reinforced concrete structures.

22) ASL -- Air, Sea, Land.? Terrorists can utilize all three at once
overwhelm the defenders.

A correctly trained Security Force would be able to hold a defensive
position against an integrated assault with multiple entries for the period of time needed for local law enforcement to respond as per the existing security plan.

23) NBC -- Nuclear, Biological, Chemical.? Terrorists can attack the
with BC to kill the operators and the security forces, and then
calmly walk
in and take over the plant.

See number 11

24) (Censored -- the terrorists might not have thought of this one.)

Lets hope not. Lets hope they've thought in line with the majority of these other ideas.

25) The terrorists can simply wait for a meltdown to occur due to a
disaster such as a tsunami, earthquake, or tornado, or due to a
manufacturing defect, or operator error.? The bottom line is, we have
terrorists in Southern California.? Their name is Southern California