Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2002 17:42:32 -0800
To: "Edward Siegel" <esiegel@tnl-online.com>
From: "Russell D. Hoffman" <rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com>
Subject: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at_a_glance/reactors/davisbesse.html

The Davis-Besse plant is a single unit reactor located east of Toledo in Oak Harbor, Ohio on the shore of Lake Erie. The site covers 954 acres of which 733 acres is leased to the U.S. government for a National Wildlife Refuge. Safety-related problems in its early years tarnished its reputation, but its sale to new owners has brought about a recovery. The site is licensed for dry storage of spent nuclear fuel and had 3 casks as of March 2000.
Operator: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.
Owners: Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (51.4%), Toledo Edison Company (48.6%)
Reactor Supplier: Babcock & Wilcox
Capacity: 873 net MWe
Reactor Type: Pressurized water reactor

Date of Operation: April 1977
License Expiration date: 04/22/2017
Electricity Produced in 2000: 6.70 billion kWh
2000 Average Capacity Factor: 87.32%

Cc: "Russell D. Hoffman" <rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com>
Subject: BEWARE Price-Anderson Act RENEWAL vis a vis GENERIC ENDEMIC  FRAUD & Possible Terrorism Against Nuclear-Plants!!!
Date: Sun, 4 Nov 2001 22:02:38 -0800
Organization: "FUZZYICS"

Subject:
            
(1) BEWARE Price-Anderson Act upcoming renewal vote limiting nuclear utilities' legal liability in the face of:
 
(2) Ongoing GENERIC ENDEMIC massive FRAUD by nuclear utilities, their vendors, their contractors, their suppliers, and with complete collusion of NRC and DoE!!! (see below)
 
(3) Possible susceptibility to possible terrorist attacks, using this verysame GENERIC ENDEMIC FRAUD, as a tool for making ~103 US nuclear-reactor power-plants into readymade weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nuclear (so called) "accidents" WAITING TO HAPPEN!!!
 
I would most strongly urge you to please read carefully this somewhat technical expose of multigenerational multidecade covered up GENERIC ENDEMIC FRAUD on nuclear-reactor power-plant (civilian and military) (so called)' "super"alloys' metallurgy [same (so called) "super"alloys as those which fail in gas-turbine and jet engines (remember the jet-engine combustion-chamber/"burn-can" explosions in the 1980's: Milwaukee, Manchester, Japan, (~1985-6)..., the Challenger,...?)]: design, component fabrication, construction, inspection, maintainance, certification, licensiing, quality assurance, quality control, reinspection, license renewal, (many old reactors FRIGHTENINGLY in the last year/recently being purchased to be relicensed to run far beyond their most optimistically intended maximum lifetimes!) and ask your staff to gather the articles highlighted below, and to contact the corroborating experts listed and highlighted below, MOST of who live and/or work in the Washington, D. C. area thus being LOCALLY almost immediately available to you, your staff, the members of and staffs of both House and Senate committees which oversee the: NRC, DoE, Price-Anderson Act renewal (and its debate!?).
 

---

 
Gentleman and Ladies:
                                  As you Senators and Representatives reconsider and vote on the Price-Anderson Act extension, limiting the legal and financial liability for nuclear-reactor power-plants to relatively nothing compared to the actual cost of any possible nuclear "accident" (waiting to happen!!!), and (too!) many reactors with (so called) "super"alloys' GENERIC ENDEMIC FRAUDULENT advanced age overageing-embrittlement [the technical subject/metallurgy of this letter; see below]
"osteoporosis" (very analogous to an old woman's bones geting ever more brittle with age with NO possibility of reversal whatsoever!!!), and its strong possibility of vertually guaranteeing the success of any possible terrorist attack(s) upon nuclear-reactor power-plants lurking,
 
Please feel free to RSVP as soon as possible as you may see fit with any: questions?, comments?
 
Most Sincerely and Respectfully,
 
Dr. Edward Siegel
Metallurgist & Physicist
Consultant
ThermAlloy Technology Ltd.
 
[Ph. D., Metallurgy, MSU (1970);
M. S., Physics, U. of Michigan (1969),
attended: NYU (Physics) & U. of Pennsylvania (Metallurgy);
B. S., CCNY (1965)]
 
Whistleblower:
[Fired, Westinghouse APD/NES, Sr. Materials Scientist (1974)
Fired, P. S. E. & G. Chief Matallurgist & Mgr., NDT/E (1976)
Fired, I. A. E. A. (Vienna) (1977)]
PLAINTIFF: Federal False Claims Act/"Qui Tam" Lawsuits
COMPLAINANT: NRC (twice), mid-late 1990s, DoE (mid-late 1990s)
 
(resume below at very end)
 

---

 
 
PERSONAL FOR B E T T Y   A N N   B O W S E R and/or PBS Newshour
 News Directors/Producers
and
VICTORIA CORDERI and/or NBC Dateline News Directors/Producers
(re: 11/1 Datelione NBC and 11/2 PBS Newshour segment on
Nuclear-Reactor Safety Against Terrorism)
 
cc: Editors and Investigative Reporters:The: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,...
 

---

 
   In the 11/1 NBC Dateline and 11/2 PBS Newshour segment on possible upcoming terrorist attacks against nuclear-reactor power-plants great probability of success, Rep. Edward Markey was dead right,
N. R. C. Chairman Meserve a bit to a lot wrong, and Mr. Beadle an outright liar!
   Why? Because, even IF the reinforced-concrete (a.k.a. "rebar") containment-structure could withstand impact of a fuel-laden jet, the (determined by: time at temperature determines it, like cooking a pizza in a microwave-oven) overageing-embrittled/"spinodally-decomposed"/"Ostwald-ripened"/
"Wigner's-diseased"
(analogous to osteoporosis in your grandmother's bones)
of (so called) "super"alloys (Nickel-based: Inconel-600 piping,  INCO-182/82 piping-to-flanges/"nozzles" transition-welds, Hastelloy-X core-internals, Iron-based: 304 & 304L stainless-steels (like your elevator doors at NBC or PBS), etc. etc.,... ) are INfamous for becoming with age, at fabrication and then ambient temperatures, VERY VERY BRITTLE hence SHOCK/"notch"-sensitive, would crack like eggshells.
   Where to attack? NOT the concrete containment, BUT the: EMBRITTLED: PIPING, FLANGES (like a person's lips), "NOZZLES" [as recently cracked at Oconee PWR in South Carolina (read on)], and STEAM GENERATORS!!! They would ALL LITERALLY SHATTER LIKE "GLASS" [see Roman Rollnick article quoted below: in The European, week ending 1/14/92-front page, about this happening to PIPING in ALL E. C. (46 PWRs in Germany, ..., 56 PWRs in France, = 102+ PWRs in E. C. by 1992].
   Why should our US reactors': same designs, same (so called) "super"alloys but OLDER (i. e. MORE AGE) be any different? (Because we're good loyasl blond haired blue eyed Americans? I think not!)
   These are even MUCH MORE VULNERABLE than spent-fuel pools if the reactor is critical/ i.e., on!!!
 
[you might want to read a layman's book: "Nuclear Power: From Physics to Politics", by Lawrence Pringle (~1979), seemingly about me; in addition Keith Snow, a noted environmental journalist,[c/0 (413) 268-7458] has writen most of a book about this and me]
 
Other references:
 
Ana Mayo (still writing for NYTimes part time?), The Village Voice, p. 40, 8/21/78 article about me "If Leaks Could Kill", in her "Geiger Counter Column" (then), about my work, Journal of Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978)
 
LOCAL D. C. REFERENCES: [the first four are in their 60's-70's, have been around alloy metallurgy/physics for a very long while, and are all VERY FAMOUS in metallurgy!]:
(1) Dr. Lydon Schwartzendruber, Metallurgy Division, N. I. S. T. /DoC, Gaithersburg, MD.
(2) Prof. Lawrence Bennett (Lydon's former boss; NIST ret.), Materials Science Dept., George Washington (?) or Georgetown(?) Univ., D.C.
(3) Prof. (ret.; Simon Fraser Univ., B. C., Canada) Anthony Arrott, World's Best Alloy Magnetism expert, LIVES IN D.C. (202) 364-6044 and eaches at some Northern VA. state university.
(4) Prof. (ret.; Univ. of Illinois Materials. Science & Physics Depts., & Case Western-Reserve Univ. also)  Wendell Williams (217) 344-5180 &/or (winter escape; FL.) (941) 349-4218
(5) Dr. Kevin Aylesworth, [used to work for Sen. Tom Harkin, (D-IA)] and in D.C. phonebook - spent quite a bit of time with me and talked extensively about this when both in Boston (~1994-~1996)
(who some of you may know personally, having been a Senate staffer for nearly a decade now!)
 
(see pdf version very short/very limited layman's summary of Lofaro Brookhaven National Laboratory/DoE/NRC nuclear "incidents" statistical/actuarial (as in "time until death"!; do to overageing-embrittlement)assessment on website:
http://www.dne.bnl.gov/ese/agingassessment.pdf
or, even better, do a Google search under "Robert Lofaro" and wade through his/Brookhaven National Laboratory's/DoE's/NRC's veryown MANY VERY NEGATIVE nuclear-reactor component/systems failures predicted FRIGHTENING RISK-ASSESSMENTS!!!
(which you may not have been aware of)
[or, for more/to be complete, have your staff(s)/commitee(s) staff(s)
gather together ANY/ALL Lofaro (MANY) reports from Brookhaven National Laboratory throughout the 1980s and 1990's]

---

 
Dr. Richard Meserve,
Chairman,
cc: Mr. Hugo Bell,
Inspector General,
Michael Steinberg,
Auditing Division, Inspector General's Office,
Agents George Mulley and Ronald Fields,
Inspector Generals Office,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Rockville, MD.
 
Dear Dr. Meserve,
 
I just heard about the Ocone, South Carolina ("8/01") PWR "nozzles" and piping transition-weld cracking, which sound a lot like the San Onofre, CA. "nozzles" and piping cracking problem!
 
This is EXACTLY what I tried to leave for you at the Hyatt Islandia in San Diego last November that American Institute of Physics CEO "Dudsky" or "Broadskii" "porloined" (unless the documents simply just "walked away themselves"?). Maybe you should have known about it a year ago? It would have helped you with this problem greatly!
 
Attached please find a (not so!) humerous article about nuclear-reactor,... (and LOOK UP ALL REFERENCES!!!)  GENERIC Fe-based "austenitic" (FCC crystal structure) (a.k.a. stainless-steels) and Ni-based "austenitic" (FCC crystal structure) (so called) "super"alloys: Inconel-600 (control-rod sleeve tubes), Hastelloy-X (core internals), and INCO-182/82 (FCC "austenitic"to BCC "ferritic" pressure-vessel steels) transition-welds.
 
Especially the latter I was THE FIRST to discover and call attention to.
[reference: Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials 7, 312 (1978);
see also article about my warnings: Ana Mayo, "Geiger Counter Column", The Village Voice, p. 40, 8/21/78]
 
For INCO-182/82 worldwide transition-weld standard for decades (1950's-1990's), I found that it takes ~ 17-22 years, which sounds EXACTLY like what is happening in South Carolina ("now") and nearby San Onofre unit here.
 
Since it happened in ALL E. C. PWRs [see R. Rollnick, The European (weekly), week ending 1/14/93 - front-page and flip-side] and in MANY Japanese PWRs, I ask:
HOW CAN IT "NOT" BE HAPPENING IN US PWRs HERE???
 
All it takes is (like heating up a pizza in a microwave) time at temperature, and OURS are OLDER!!!
 
OF COURSE it IS, NOT just "now" and NOT just "only" in South Carolina, but most probably VERY WIDESPREAD and well covered up, or simply ignored and not recognized by: utilities, energy-companies, NRC, DoE!
(yet, since ~1988 a HUGE amount of money has been spend by NRC on studying this phenomenon; just ask NRC public information service to do an NRC/DoE literature search under superalloy embrittlement, Wigner's-disease, Ostwald-ripening, spinodal-decomposition, overageing, ageing, overageing-embrittlement, "sensitization", ... and you'll see the NRC/DoE CRASH program on this for perhaps ~13 years!)
 
[See Jonathan Pollard's last UCS report (I believe 9/95?) on stainless-steel skirts SUDDEN embrittlement at ~ 17-20 years in G. E. BWRs! There the culprit is 304 stainless steel. They use 304L ("L" meaning low-carbon, to slow down this overageing-embrittlement) and it failed too!]
 
[See also Lai's Met. Trans. AIME, 9A, 827 (1978) reference figure 2 on Hastelloy-X for just HOW FAST this can happen: 100 hrs.( = 4 DAYS!)/~2years = < 1% of intended lifetime!
[this is what fails and explodes, combustion-chambers in GE & P&W jet-engines]]
 
The GENERIC problem is called: Wigner's-disease, Ostwald-ripening, spinodal-decomposition, ageing, overageing, overageing-embrittlement, (euphemistically) "sensitization".
 
Ask any machinist. When it happens in tool steels (drills or lathe cutting-tools), it's called "streamers"
(NOT the cut metal chips), stringd/chains and sheets of brttle-carbides that grow in a more ductile tool-steel matrix. And the tools delaminate, literally crack apart, JUST LIKE for (so called) "super"alloys in PWRs and BWRs!
 
I hate to say "I (at least tried in 11/00 to) told you so", but...
(Q: just how did I sneak into the South Carolina PWR and cause this???
 A: It MUST be going on in ALL US PWRs and BWRs for MANY KINDS of DIFFERENT (so called) "super"alloys in many different components!!!)
 
Have you ever read Robert Lofaro's (BNL) [see below] "bean counting" INPO incidents actuarial projections? Based upon past INPO/NRC documents, Lofaro (no metallurgist) predicted ~ 1990-1992 at the ?th Light Water Reactor Safety Conference, summarized in the Journal "Failure Analysis" quarterly in ~1991-2, and in a sequence of BNL reports probably right there in your NRC library, something like a ~73(!!!)% probability of failure due to (this) (so called) "super"alloy GENERIC (OVER)-"ageing" [a. k. a.:
Wigner's-disease, Ostwald-ripening, spinodal-decomposition, overageing, overageing-embrittlement, "sensitization",...]
(this latter decidedly NOT meaning sitting around a campfire and singing "Kumbaya",...  )
leading to EXPONENTIAL(!!!) reactor systems failure probability!
(a. k.a. technically "chaos"!!!)
 
 
Please RSVP if you need any consulting help
(from someone who can be HONEST with you about this GENERIC problem you've inherited, and, because he discovered it in INCO-182/82 transition-weld alloy 25 years ago,
KNOWS WHAT'S GOING ON!
 
Most Respectfully,
 
Dr. Edward Siegel
Metallurgist & Physicist
Consultant
ThermAlloy Technology Ltd.
 
[Ph. D., MSU (1970), M. S., U. of Michigan (1969), attended: NYU & U. of Pennsylvania; B. S., CCNY (1965)]
 
Whistleblower:
[Fired, Westinghouse APD/NES, Sr. Materials Scientist (1974)
Fired, P. S. E. & G. Chief Matallurgist & Mgr., NDT/E (1976)
Fired, I. A. E. A. (Vienna) (1977)]
 

---

                                            The "U. S. S. KURSK":

          Generic Endemic Navy (SSN, SSBN, CVN) /

                    Utility NUCLEAR "ACCIDENTS"

                          WAITING TO HAPPEN!!!

(Courtesy: Westinklouse, G.-E., P. & W./U.-T., A.B.B./C.-E., B. & W., Inco, Haynes, Cabot, Prudential...)

                                                "Señor Admirálíssimo El Exigente ("OsamaBin")von"      

                                                                    Dr. Edward Siegel

                                                                         Consultant

                                                             Metallurgy and Alloy Physics

                                                               ThermAlloy Technology Ltd.

                                                                            (TAT(L))

       ("Avenger of U.K. Admiral Sir Walter Raleigh s 1492 Vanquishing of the Spanish Armada")

                                                                         (858) 270-5111

                                                 esiegel@tnl-online.com / tat@tnl-online.com

 

· very recent Oconee, S. C. PWR "niozzles" severe cracking, mirrored in San Onofre, CA. PWR "nozzles" cracking (which the NRC refuses to order inspected, muchless nationwide in ALL PWRs (and BWRs), and the utilities (like San Onofre's owner, nearly bankrupt Southern California Edison, refuse to do!, and actively lobby against!)

· recent (5/19/00; Gibraltar/Algericas Bay) H. M. S. Tire"less"d SSN nuclear attack-submarine                        [Reuters News dispatch: (San Diego Union Tribune, p. 2, 10/22/00) but "amazingly" in no other national U. S. paper: neither: N.Y.T., nor L. A. T., nor W.-P.,...-talk about managed news!!!]; [also: in  El Pais (Madrid, Spain major daily (10/31/00) - on WWW) & on B.B.C. News, [N.P.T.V.; KPBS-Ch.15 (10/31/00), in which Spanish Prime Minister demanded to British Prime Minister that the U.K. "tow it our of Iberian waters forthwith!"], now renamed the H. M. S. "Aged" & Tired) and dry-dock/inspections of whole rest (12) of U.K. SSN nuclear attack-sub fleet, necessitating U. S. Navy guarding of their U. K. whole SSBN nuclear fleet ballistic-missile boats & G.-E.-KAPL core-meltdown diagnosis (518) 587-3245 / Jackshal@aol.com

· plus older French nuclear attack-submarine SSN Emeraud steam-"leak" killing Captain and Nine Crew (Boston Globe, p.25, 3/31/94 ),

· plus recent dire warning on Internet by John. P. Shannon and Bob Stater, [G.-E. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) retired Nuclear Engineers, Former Health and Safety Manager, designers of Navy nuclear-reactor cores for some thirty years; @ 262 Jones Rd., Saratoga Springs, N. Y. 12866 / tel: (518) 587-3245 / Jackshal@aol.com] that the H.M.S. Tire"less"d , with no loss-of-coolant (LOC) emergency-core-cooling-system (ECCS) [as do all other nuclear Navy ships of any/all types and any/all countries similarly lack] actually suffered a loss-of-coolant-"accident" (LOCA; "China-Syndrome") on 5/19/00 and is now stuck powerless and unmovable in Gibraltar/Algereicas Bay, and that ...

· ALL 57 U.S. SSN attack-submarines nuclear-reactor cores (which they designed for 30 years) should be as susceptible to and hence suffer similar LOCA "China-Syndrome" problems in the future!!!

· early unheeded by both nuclear Navy(ies)/commercial nuclear utilities metallurgical warnings of "super"alloy generic endemic overageing-embrittlement thermal-instability in-fabrication / in-service problems warnings:

· (the) Dr. Eugene P. Wigner (Nobel Laureate, physics, who took Einstein s letter to Roosevelt),                        Jnl. Applied Physics 17, 857 (1946)

· Dr. E. Siegel (Metallurgist), Jnl. Magnetism & Magnetic Materials, 7, 312 (1978)@ ICMAO, Technion, Haifa

· Ana Mayo, the Village Voice, "If Leaks Could Kill", Geiger Counter Column, p. 40 (8/21/78)

· Dr. G. Lai, Metallurgical Transactions AIME, 9A, 827 (1978) - especially unbelievable Fig. 2/y-axis!!!)

· Dr. J. R. Kattus, Code # 4112, U. S. DoD Aerospace Structural Materials Handbook, Battelle (1983) - OFFICIAL DoD WARNINGS!!!

· Dr. E. Siegel (in abstract) 1978 - prediction of Monju, Japan Breeder Reactor nuclear "accident"                 (Japan Times, front page (12/10-12/95) & thereafter - on WWW in English)

· E. C. (esp. France & Germany) mandatory commercial nuclear-reactor pressure-vessel heads and cooling piping replacements due to embrittlement-cracking                                                                         (R. Rollnick, The European, (1/14/93) front page headlines)

· E. Savage and E. Nippies, Jnl. Welding (1963-67) - many technical papers on "super"alloy welds generic embrittlement

· Howard Richards(RIP), metallurgist, PSE&G (largest utility/N. J.) suppressed dire multi-decade warnings

· Professor W. B. Pearson, renowned Canadian metallurgist, University of Waterloo - multi-decade dire warnings of generic "super"alloy overageing-embrittlement catastrophic-failures in nuclear power-plants

· H.M.S.S. Titanic, (W. Broad, New York Times, reprinted in San Diego Union Tribune, p. E2, (2/4/98)) which sank because of (closely related) metallurgical embrittlement of steel bolts and hull plates,...

Warnings, Portents, Continuing / Ongoing Disasters, and Trends are Clear / Undeniable!!!

Do the Governments have the courage to ACT NOW???

---

                                                                      RESUME

                                               Dr. Edward Siegel

messages: c/o:                                                           (858) 270-5111

                            (best: A. M. & Nights - 7 days- PACIFIC-time - NO-voicemail)

                                                          esiegel@tnl-online.com

                                                              tat@tnl-online.com

___________________________________

Seeking

Creative challenging position in alloy metallurgy/NDT/ceramics/materials/process engineering/ utilizing my diverse heuristic skills: problem-solving, incisive analysis, and optimization, reasoning with: ambiguity, uncertainty, analogy, induction, deduction, via insightful disambiguation for decisive implementation with applications in: metallurgy/NDT/ materials/process-engineering: failure-analysis, troubleshooting, yield-enhancement, reliability, testing, QC, QA in both fab/R.& D. environments.

___________________________________

Skills-Set and Accomplishments

Initiating Failure-Analysis of: utility power-plants (nuclear and fossil), pipelines: gas, water, naptha, hydrogen,....

Implementing Yield-Enhancement of: utility power-plants (nuclear and fossil), pipelines: gas, water, naptha, hydrogen,....

Troubleshooting of development and fab process bottlenecks; in-process testing during fabrication.

Consulting within organizations on materials/process-specific problems in development and fabrication processes.

Developing real-time Q.A. and interactive Q.C. during processing for process yield-optimization.

Managing international-programs including: planning, reporting, staffing, vendor-liaison, foreign-government liaison, consulting, troubleshooting, failure-analysis, yield-enhancement, Q.C., Q.A., databases,..., in both fab, and R.& D.

Consulting/Troubleshooting/Qualifying ferrous/nonferrous alloys in high stress and/or high corrosion environments fabrication techniques and quality parameters

Qualifying selection of optimum materials of construction/fabrication practices for commodity items to maximize cost effectiveness

Determining cause and required remedial action for metallurgical failures in electrical/gas distribution/ transmission components: pipelines, valves, pumps, rotating/reciprocating equipment: compressors, structural facilities, pressure vessels,...

Anticipating potential alloy metallurgy problems: corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, fracture, hydrogen embrittlement, hydrogen sulfide cracking, brittle failure, plastic collapse, cyclic fatigue, corrosion fatigue failures.

Managed/Directed failure analysis of electricity/gas generating/transmission equipment/tools

Qualified/Monitored/Recommended Changes to existing: weld-alloys, welding-procedures, welder- qualification practices, industry codes/methods

Provided support to operations: maintainance/engineering/design/fabrication/construction firms on large capital intensive generation/transmission plants/facilities

Developed/Qualified alloy processing: welding, machining, forging, casting, powder-metallurgy: ball-milling, hot pressing, cold isostatic pressing, sintering, consolidation...

Managed/Performed: failure analysis of failure mechanisms corrosion, environmental cracking, fatigue, brittle failure, plastic collapse,...

Analyzed/Managed/Selected appropriate analysis methods: fracture mechanics, metallography, macrophotography, SEM, EDAX, mechanical testing, NDT (especially acoustic-emission, ultrasonics)

Developed/Managed/Implemented testing/inspection methodology: component analysis methods, destructive and non-destructive testing (radiography, acoustic-emission, ultrasonics, magnetic particle, dye penetrant,...

Developed/Managed/Implemented/Mitigated corrosion: testing, prevention, mitigation engineering via corrosion resistant fab/construction materials: metallic/ceramic/polymer/composite/cermet coatings for corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, hydrogen embrittlement, hydrogen sulfide cracking, corrosion fatigue deceleration/prevention

Analyzed/Managed/Selected/Assessed fracture mechanics: Charpy V-notch/ CTOD testing, brittle failure prevention, plastic collapse failure criteria, corrosion-damage, mechanical-damage,..., especially superalloy (INCO-182/82), HASTELLOY-X,... magnetic-testing discovery/calibration and heat-treatment reversal

Managed international transnational ANSI, API, NACE, codes/standards compliance.

___________________________________

Experience

ENTREPRENEURIAL new-ventures/start-ups and CONSULTANT

[ Silicon Valley, CA.: Dysan, Memorex, I.B.M., Systron-Donner,..., MA: Trillenium, and E.C. (Italy & Vienna): I.A.E.A./I.C.T.P., OPEC, Petrobras, A. G. A., Proton-Diamant, Excalibur, Eureka, and in former Eastern Bloc, ]:

"Digit-counting" QA/QC/Auditing on-average statistical inter-digit correlations logarithmic-law ["fraud detection"] inversion and expansion to reveal its/digits hidden quantum-physics with extensive applications to: auditing, Q.C., Q.A., accounting, fraud-detection, systematic-bias error-detection, digital-computing correction, quantum-computing implementations, software-packages,...

[popular refs: M. Browne, N.Y.T. (8/4/98)-front page/Science section; T. Hill, Am. Sci. (7-8/98); R. Mathews, New Sci (7/10/99)]

"Fuzzyics" & "Rough-Stoffe" Fuzzy-Logic & Rough-Sets Artificial-Intelligence packages.

"Static-Synergetics": real-time/during processing Q.A. and interactive Q.C. for yield-enhancement optimization.

Proton-Diamant: Proton-in-Diamond optimal heat-sink ion-implantation/diffusion interconnects.

Solar-Hydrogen-Water: solar-energy production of water via hydrogen/hydride-storage and gravity.

"ThermAlloy-Technology"(TAT):Ni-based superalloys/Fe-based stainless-steels thermal overageing-embrittlement catastrophic-failure preclusion via magnetic-N.D.T. real-time Q.A./alloy-rejuvenation heat-treatment Q.C.for forced-outage/maintenance/accident minimization process yield-optimization.

"Excalibur": earthquake sub-Hertz sub-audio infra-sonic/electromagnetic early-warning alarm sensors.

"Eureka"/"Shazam": Neural-Network Automatic Optimization via "Fuzzyics" & "Rough-Stoffe" A.-I.

"Bucky-Ball" Fullerine/Fulleride versus Cuprate High-Temperature Superconductivity enhancement.

Bioelectronic nerve pain-analgesia, cardiology-therapy, DNA-control by 1/f-noise nonlinear-dynamics

_______________________________________

Experience

NDT SENSOR/DETECTOR PHYSICIST/ENGINEER National Research Council, Space Agency, São Paulo, BRAZIL

ALLOY METALLURGY NDT CONSULTANT, Petrobras, São Paulo, BRAZIL

NDT SENSOR/ DETECTOR PHYSICIST/ENGINEER, Queen Mary College, University of London, UK

POLYMER-ALLOY-CERAMICS ELECTROCHEMIST, Molecular Energy Research Co, Westwood, NJ

NUCLEAR ALLOYS/CERAMICS CONSULTANT, International Atomic Energy Agency, INDONESIA/ AUSTRIA.

MANAGER: METALLURGY, MATERIALS, NDT, Public Service Electric & Gas. Co., Newark, NJ

SENIOR ALLOY METALLURGIST, Westinghouse Atomic-Power/Electronic-Device Div., Pittsburgh, PA

SENIOR ALLOY METALLURGIST, General Motors Technical Center, Manufacturing Development, Warren, MI

ALLOY METALLURGICAL ENGINEER Ford Motor Company Scientific Research Staff, Dearborn, MI.

ALLOY METALLURGICAL ENGINEER Weston Instruments Div.of Schlumberger, Newark, NJ

ALLOY PLASMA-SPRAY COATINGS ENGINEER Dewey Space Physics Laboratory, NY, NY

ALLOY METALLURGICAL ENGINEER/FAB MANAGER Silicon Transistor Corp., Carle Place, NY

CERAMICS/COMPOSITE/ALLOYS ENGINEER US Army Materials Research Agency, Watertown, MA

_______________________________________

Education

DOCTOR OF ENGINEERING Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI Metallurgy

MASTER OF SCIENCE University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Physics.

[ attended: University of Pennsylvania Materials-Science ; New York University Physics ]

BACHELOR OF SCIENCE City College of New York (C.C.N.Y.), NY,NY Physics.

[ attended: Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO Metallurgy, Mineralogy, Geophysics ]
 

http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/artikkel?Avis=TO&Dato=20020305&Kategori=NEWS17&Lopenr=103050046&Ref=AR

Tests spot 5 defects in safety devices at Davis-Besse
Davis-Besse flaws on repair schedule

By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - Five of 69 primary safety devices used to help control FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant have been operating with cracks in them, possibly for years.

The flaws, discovered by ultrasonic tests, caught the utility by surprise yesterday. The latest round of visual inspections only days ago revealed no problems, and neither did visual inspections during refueling outages every two years since at least 1996, Richard Wilkins, FirstEnergy spokesman, said.

Barring any complications, the defects will be repaired during the plant’s biennial refueling and maintenance outage, which began in mid-February and is to conclude at the end of this month. The additional cost was not known, he said.

The danger of ignoring repairs isn’t so much a radiation leak as it is compromising the integrity of devices that are essential to helping control-room operators shut down the plant in the event of an emergency.

The plant is along Lake Erie in rural Ottawa County, about 25 miles east of Toledo.

A company report on the matter is expected to be completed today or tomorrow. Among the first to be notified will be officials at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s headquarters in Washington and its Midwest regional office in Lisle, Ill.

Regulators from that agency last year expressed concerns about Davis-Besse and a dozen other nuclear plants that have pressurized water reactors, because a similar plant in South Carolina was found to have circumference-type cracks in devices known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles. Those nozzles are long, vertical tubes in the reactor head that serve as passageways for rods that control-room operators use to absorb excess neutrons in the reactor core, thereby keeping the plant running as it should.

Plants can operate safely if the metal tubes get a tiny vertical crack. The NRC’s anxiety grew because it had not previously seen nozzles crack in a circular manner, leading regulators to envision scenarios in which the metal could further weaken.

During the first week of December, the NRC considered issuing FirstEnergy a rare government order to shut down Davis-Besse for an emergency inspection - something that hasn’t been done anywhere in the country since 1987.

The agency backed off, largely because FirstEnergy offered to move up its refueling and maintenance outage about six weeks ahead of schedule.

The ultrasonic tests were the first on Davis-Besse’s reactor nozzles in the plant’s 25-year history.

Preliminary results that came back from a laboratory yesterday showed three nozzles with defects that warrant immediate repairs. Another two nozzles had cracks so tiny they could be inconsequential from a safety standpoint. But the utility will repair all five, Mr. Wilkins said.

None of the nozzles shows evidence of the dangerous, circumference-type crack that worried the NRC, though one "looks like it was starting to go around," he said.

Cracks can take years to develop, Mr. Wilkins said.

NRC officials were not available for comment last night.

Detroit Edison Co.’s Fermi II nuclear plant in northern Monroe County was not identified last year as being susceptible to nozzle cracks, because it has a different type of reactor. It has a boiling-water reactor.

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No leaks found in Davis-Besse’s cracked nozzles

By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - None of the five cracked nozzles on top of FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant reactor appears to have leaked.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed yesterday there was no salt-like buildup of boric acid on the exterior of metal tubes known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles, a sign that the cracks were confined to the interior of the devices.

It’s also a sign that the utility was able to head off the problem before it could have evolved into a greater safety risk, Jan Strasma, NRC spokesman, said.

Davis-Besse and other nuclear plants with pressurized water reactors have 69 such nozzles penetrating their reactor vessel heads.

The nozzles - essentially metal tubes - are considered part of the primary safety system because they help control-room operators plunge neutron-absorbing rods up and down the reactor core. That keeps the plant running as it should.

Nozzle cracks are not uncommon and typically take years to develop. They need to be fixed, though, so that they don’t create more obstacles if there’s a need for an emergency shutdown, Mr. Strasma explained.

The cracks were diagnosed by a series of ultrasonic tests - the first in the plant’s 25-year history. The fact they were confined to the interior of the nozzles helps explain why they went undetected in visual inspections during refueling outages every two years since 1996, the latest of which was completed in late February. Those inspections cover only the exterior of the nozzles, he said.

FirstEnergy has impressed regulators by not only making plans to fix the cracked nozzles - but with its plans to install a new reactor head during the plant’s next refueling outage in 2004, complete with 69 new nozzles.

The project will be enormous: Dome-shaped vessel heads are 14 feet wide and made of solid steel, some four feet thick in the middle.

FirstEnergy declined to provide cost estimates for that project, as well as its latest round of repairs.

New vessel heads cost on the order of $15 million to $20 million - approximately $5 million to $8 million to build, plus another $10 million to $12 million for expenses such as design and installation, according to Melanie Lyons, spokeswoman for the nuclear industry’s Washington-based trade group, the Nuclear Energy Institute.

The utility will be the first in the NRC’s seven-state Midwest region to bring in a whole new vessel head, according Mr. Strasma, who described it as a "prudent move on their part."

The utility wants to start fresh with a new reactor cover to avoid more expensive repairs when the plant gets older and more nozzles become susceptible to cracks. "That’s certainly one of the factors and a strong one," Richard Wilkins, FirstEnergy spokesman, said.

Another is the company’s hope that Davis-Besse has more years left in it, he said. The plant’s 40-year license expires in 2017, but company officials notified the government several months ago that they intend to seek a 10-year extension.

Mr. Wilkins said that the plant always will need various parts replaced but that it has been running in good shape: It set an internal record of 639 days - nearly two years - of continuous operation until shutting down for refueling Feb. 16.

"The only way you can do that is to have confidence in the equipment you have," Mr. Wilkins said.

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Davis-Besse, Fermi II pass safety evaluations

The Toledo area’s two nuclear plants received passing marks in their latest government evaluations.

FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse plant in Ottawa County and Detroit Edison Co.’s Fermi II plant in Monroe County were notified by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this week that they "operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and fully met all cornerstone objectives."

Letters acknowledging the results were posted on the government agency’s Internet web site yesterday. Both plants are about 25 miles from Toledo.

A public meeting is set for April 3 at the Davis-Besse administration building to discuss that plant’s results. No meeting is scheduled to discuss Fermi’s results.

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Regulators issue acid-damage alert

By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER


OAK HARBOR - Although the latest discovery of corrosion on top of FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear reactor could be less serious than what was found last week, federal regulators want all other nuclear plants to check for similar problems.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has sent a bulletin outlining Davis-Besse’s reactor head damage to the nation’s 103 nuclear plants with special instructions to 69 that have pressurized water reactors.

Davis-Besse, in Ottawa County, has a pressurized water reactor. Detroit Edison Co.’s Fermi II nuclear plant in northern Monroe County is a different type of structure: It has a boiling water reactor.

All plants with pressurized water reactors are being required to submit detailed information on how the structural integrity of their reactor vessel heads has been examined recently. The information will be used to determine if any of them need to be shut down for emergency inspection, NRC spokesman Jan Strasma said.
Fermi II and other plants with boiling water reactors were provided the bulletin for informational purposes only.

A similar thing happened last year after Duke Energy Corp. found unusual circumference-type cracks in two nozzles on top of that utility’s Oconee 3 reactor in South Carolina. Those type of cracks made regulators believe the nozzles could eventually split open and impede use of the control rods.

Major corrosion discovered last week at Davis-Besse - described as the most severe of its type ever found on top of a U.S. nuclear reactor head - did not pose an immediate radiation threat to the public because no steam escaped from the reactor.

Even if it had, safety systems were designed to immediately kick in and help cool the reactor. Any steam that would have escaped would have been trapped by thick concrete walls of the reactor’s containment building.

The NRC was stunned by the corrosion because of how deeply it had penetrated the reactor head. In the bulletin it sent to nuclear plants, the NRC stated that degradation of the reactor head or other portions of reactor coolant pressure boundary "can pose a significant safety risk if permitted to progress to the point that their integrity is in question and the risk of a loss of coolant accident increases."

Boric acid from the reactor leaked through at least two devices known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles.

Acid from one of those nozzles burned through all six inches of carbon steel that makes up the reactor cap’s upper layer, leaving a cavity four inches wide and about seven inches across. The only thing stopping it from burning a hole through the reactor head was a thin layer of stainless steel, which is about three-eighths of an inch thick or roughly the width of a pencil eraser. That type of steel is impervious to boric acid.

Though the NRC was awaiting more information yesterday about the latest discovery of corrosion, FirstEnergy doesn’t believe it’s as extensive as that found last week.

Richard Wilkins, utility spokesman, said the corrosion measured around a second leaking nozzle penetrated about four inches of the carbon steel and left a cavity that extended only about a quarter-inch from the side of the nozzle. The damage was limited to a section of the nozzle that measures about 15/8 inches across, he said.

The two most problematic nozzles are among 69 welded into the reactor head. Five were found to have tiny cracks shortly after the plant was shut down for normal refueling and maintenance Feb. 16.

Another one of those five nozzles - three altogether - is believed to have a crack which goes all the way through it. More tests are being done to see if acid made it through that nozzle, though Mr. Wilkins said there has not yet been the most tell-tale sign: the formation of salt-like boric acid crystals on the outside of the tube.

The cost to repair all damage could reach $10 million. The utility hopes to have the work done by late June, though the NRC won’t allow the company to restart the plant until it is satisfied that sufficient repairs have been made.

FirstEnergy hopes to avoid a repeat of the problem by installing a reactor head with 69 new nozzles when Davis-Besse is shut down for its next biennial refueling outage in 2004. Such project typically costs up to $20 million. Those costs can’t be passed on to customers.

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Outage at Besse extended 2 months
Reactor head repair to cost up to $10M

By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant likely will be idle at least two months longer than originally thought because of extensive corrosion on top of the plant’s reactor head that will cost $5 million to $10 million to repair.

The utility yesterday announced its revised timetable and gave an estimate for how much it expects to spend on the repairs. That’s all subject to change, however, depending on what a team of about 50 experts from throughout the country learn as they probe deeper into the cause of the corrosion.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the government agency that regulates the nuclear industry, won’t let the plant resume operation until it is convinced it is safe, regardless of what timetable the utility hopes to meet, NRC spokesman Jan Strasma said.

"Our team got on the site and began its inspection yesterday [Tuesday]," he said.

Davis-Besse was shut down for normal refueling Feb. 16 for what was supposed to be a six-week outage.

But serious corrosion was discovered following a series of ultrasonic tests and follow-up inspections: In one area of the top of the reactor head, measuring about four inches wide and five inches across, boric acid from the reactor had dripped out and burned through six inches of carbon steel. The only thing left in that part of the reactor head was the bottom layer of stainless steel, which is less than a half-inch wide.

The acid escaped via a device called a control rod drive mechanism nozzle. There are 69 such nozzles implanted in a typical head covering a pressurized water reactor. At Davis-Besse, five of those nozzles have cracked and one near the center of the reactor head appears to be troublesome.

The utility announced Monday that the outage would continue through late April instead of late March. It now appears more likely the plant will remain shut down until at least late May or late June, assuming it can stick to its latest timetable and get the NRC to sign off on repairs, FirstEnergy spokesman Richard Wilkins said. The delay was necessitated largely because the large team of experts the utility assembled to look into the problem wants to explore a number of options, he said.

The utility acknowledged an outside possibility it might keep the plant shut down for several more months and wait for a replacement reactor head in lieu of repairing the one that has covered the reactor since the plant opened nearly 25 years ago.

FirstEnergy has put in an order for a new reactor head, but the dome-shaped device - 17 feet wide and made of steel - will take months to build. The utility still plans to install it in 2004, during its next anticipated refueling outage, unless repairs go beyond June and the manufacturer can reduce the time it takes to build the new one, Mr. Wilkins said.

Replacing the reactor head is a massive project some industry experts in Washington said costs $15 million to $20 million. FirstEnergy won’t say how much it expects to spend, nor will it verify the industry estimate, Mr. Wilkins said.

The costs will not be passed along to consumers. The utility has contingency money set aside for improvements, and is bound to existing rates in its deregulation agreement with the Ohio Public Utilities Commission. "The bottom line is, they [customers] aren’t going to see rate increases because of this," Mr. Wilkins said.

Though the shutdown could extend to the beginning of summer - when electricity usage peaks - FirstEnergy expects to continue meeting the energy needs of its customers.

Bulk power will be bought from other companies if the utility can’t generate enough from its other two nuclear plants - the Perry plant east of Cleveland and the Beaver Valley plant in western Pennsylvania - as well as the company’s eight coal-fired plants. Contracts with other companies give FirstEnergy legal assurance to get any additional power it needs to make up for a deficit, Mr. Wilkins said.

Davis-Besse generates 935 megawatts of electricity when running at full power - roughly the same amount used by the Toledo metropolitan area and half of the utility’s northwest Ohio service base, he said.

Members of nuclear watchdog groups said the leak is a clear sign that federal regulators are not properly monitoring the industry.

Critics of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission questioned the agency’s decision to allow the Davis-Besse plant to keep operating even though cracks had been found at another plant a year ago. "It underscores the many problems and risks in letting these older plants forge ahead when they’re already showing problems," said Hugh Jackson, a policy analyst at Public Citizen in Washington.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

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A scare at Davis-Besse

First-Energy's Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station near Oak Harbor is getting unwanted national attention after officials discovered serious corrosion problems in a critical safety device. But the sudden federal scrutiny is certainly warranted to reassure an apprehensive public.

The corrosion was caused by a leak of radioactive water that dripped unnoticed, apparently for years, onto the top of Davis-Besse’s massive reactor vessel. The acidic water ate a hole all the way through a six-inch-thick carbon steel wall on the reactor vessel. It did not, however, breach a thinner protective stainless steel liner below.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials said such corrosion has never been seen before, and convened a 50-person task force of experts to study the problem. The NRC also immediately alerted owners of the other 102 operational nuclear reactors to be on the lookout for a similar problem.

The NRC’s actions certainly were justified.

The reactor vessel, a sealed vault 17 feet in diameter, is one of the first lines of defense in preventing release of radioactive material to the surrounding environment in the event of a serious accident. It is located under yet-another protective layer, the thick reinforced concrete dome that is one of Davis-Besse’s exterior signatures.

Thankfully, the problem was detected in time, while the reactor was shut down for maintenance. There was no release of radioactivity and no harm to the public or plant workers.

Even if an emergency had arisen while Davis-Besse was in operation, the plant could have been shut down safely, FirstEnergy officials stated.

Nobody knows whether the corrosion was an isolated problem limited to Davis-Besse, or a generic problem that affects other nuclear plants. NRC should resolve that question quickly, for these are critical times for the nuclear power industry.

President Bush’s new energy plan envisions a renaissance of nuclear power, which produces electricity with abundant supplies of domestic uranium fuel. Public opinion also showed signs of improving, since nuclear fuel is abundant and does not release air pollutants that contribute to global warming.

Public confidence, however, remains a major barrier to increased use of nuclear power.

NRC should give particular emphasis to the implications, if any, for relicensing aging nuclear power plants. Many nuclear stations, including Davis-Besse, are moving toward the end of the 40-year life span for which they were designed.

Like other owners, FirstEnergy plans to ask the NRC for permission to continue operating for an additional 10 years. The NRC’s studies indicated that plants generally can continue operating safely.

The public needs reassurance, however, that hidden corrosion - and other problems unforeseen by the NRC - are not lurking in nuclear power’s future.

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More damage found on Davis-Besse reactor

By TOM HENRY
BLADE STAFF WRITER

OAK HARBOR - More damage has been found on top of FirstEnergy Corp.’s Davis-Besse nuclear plant reactor.

Boric acid from the reactor is now believed to have escaped through two points of the dome-shaped, 17-foot-wide steel lid that covers the vessel, Richard Wilkins, FirstEnergy spokesman, said last night. In each case, the acid has gotten through cracks in long steel tubes known as control rod drive mechanism nozzles.

The nozzles, welded into the reactor head, are primary safety devices because they help operators control what goes on inside the reactor.

The latest inspection revealed the same type of evidence that led to last week’s initial discovery of massive corrosion: Salt-like deposits of boric acid on top of the reactor head next to a cracked nozzle, Mr. Wilkins said.

Officials have described the corrosion found around one nozzle last week as the worst of its kind on a U.S. nuclear reactor head.

Boric acid burned through all six inches of carbon steel on top of the vessel head, creating a cavity about four inches wide and five inches across. It was stopped by only a half-inch of stainless steel, which is impervious to that type of acid.

The extent of the damage of the latest discovery won’t be known for about two weeks, in part because the nozzle in question is hard to remove. Much of the work will be done by robotic equipment, Mr. Wilkins said.

Jan Strasma, spokesman for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Midwest regional office in Lisle, Ill., was not available for comment last night.

The plant has been shut down since Feb. 16, when it was taken off line for refueling. The utility brought in about 50 experts from across the country to discuss what repairs should be made after the initial corrosion was found.

The government agency sent in its own team of inspectors, and notified all other nuclear plants to be on the lookout for similar problems. FirstEnergy announced last week that the plant could remain idle until the end of June, possibly three months longer than originally planned. It was not immediately known if the discovery of additional corrosion will cause a further delay, Mr. Wilkins said.

San Onofre operators asked to examine reactor vessels
PHIL DIEHL
Staff Writer
SAN ONOFRE ---- Federal regulators announced Tuesday they have asked all operators of nuclear reactors such as the two at San Onofre for new information about the strength of their reactor vessel heads.
The heads are where control rods, instrumentation nozzles and vents penetrate the solid steel of the vessels to reach the nuclear fuel inside. Welds around those penetrations have been found to leak water at some nuclear plants.
A leak discovered this month at the Davis-Besse plant at Oak Harbor, Ohio had allowed a large amount of boric acid to accumulate on the reactor head. The boric acid ate a 6-inch-deep hole in the pressurized steel container and nearly penetrated the head. A second, smaller hole in the top of the same reactor was reported Tuesday.
Power plant operators routinely add boric acid to the water that flows through reactors because the chemical helps control the nuclear reaction. A form of the element boron, boric acid absorbs neutrons the same way a lead shield does. Any water that escapes through a leak quickly evaporates leaving behind the boric acid and any other minerals carried in it.
"Boric acid has long been found on reactor vessel head for different reasons," said Linda Smith, an engineer at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regional headquarters in Arlington, Texas.
"What's different here ... is the corrosion rate," she said. "Almost all the carbon steel was gone. That's not been seen before."
Boric acid deposits had never caused any significant corrosion before, Smith said. This time the boric acid had eaten almost all the way through the thick layer of carbon steel to the thin internal layer of stainless steel, which is impervious to the acid. Without the backing of the carbon steel, she added, the reactor's internal pressure had begun to stretch the stainless steel liner outward at the point of the corrosion.
Federal regulators are studying the corrosion at Davis-Besse, discovered during routine maintenance work, to learn more about what caused it.
A sudden break in the pressurized reactor vessel could allow large amounts of contaminated water and steam to escape from the vessel, although U.S. nuclear plants are built with concrete and steel domes designed to contain any such leaks and prevent contamination from reaching the outside environment.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station operators examine their vessel heads for leaks and corrosion during the refueling and maintenance work done about every two years for each of the reactors.
"In the past we have found very small residual deposits (of boric acid)," said plant spokesman Ray Golden, adding that no significant corrosion has been found at San Onofre.
Each of San Onofre's two operating reactors has 102 different penetrations of the reactor vessel head, he said. Ninety-one of those penetrations are for control rods, 10 are for instruments, and one is a vent.
San Onofre's reactor vessel heads are due for their most detailed inspection ever during their next refuelings, which are scheduled to start in May for Unit 2 and January for Unit 3. The plants began production in 1983 and '84.
The insulation that covers a portion of the head will be removed and replaced, Golden said. While the insulation is off, inspectors will be able to see portions of the head and nozzles that were inaccessible before.
Federal regulators sent their request for more information to all operators of pressurized water reactors, in which the water that circulates through the reactor is not allowed to turn to steam.
The United States has 102 operating commercial nuclear reactors, of which 69 are pressurized water reactors. The others are boiling water reactors, in which the water that cools the reactor turns to steam.
Contact staff writer Phil Diehl at (760) 901-4087 or pdiehl@nctimes.com.
3/20/02