To: "Bob Nichols" <bobnichols@cox.net>
From: "Russell D. Hoffman" <rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com>
Subject: Re: Security at nuke plants; pictorial history of nuclear power
In-Reply-To: <3D345267.000001.01228@bob>
Hi Bob,
Thanks for your letter (shown below) and the forwarded information about plans to federalize our nation's nuclear security forces. I agree that the federalization of security forces at nukes plants is reasonable, and perhaps even inevitable -- at least, it will be after a terrorist incident finally occurs -- and one will occur, sooner or later, we all know that.
And you're definitely right: the plants need to be charged for the cost of this security! To pretend it's a cost the public needs to absorb is preposterous, when only 20% of our electricity comes from the nuke industry anyway (much less, if you subtract out electricity used in the nuclear fuel as being a simple "round robin" net loss within a useless industry). Less still, if you subtract out the cost of cancers, leukemias, and birth defects in the population because of our foolish energy choice. So those few who benefit from nuclear technology should pay the full costs of protection. Capitalism has it's benefits.
In any event, speaking of the glories of capitalism, the cost of a federalized, more robust security force would probably bankrupt the plants, and even if it didn't bankrupt them somehow (by being inadequate, to be exact), it would still eat into their profits like nothing they've ever experienced before (except shutting the plants down, something they are equally loath to do, unless forced to by regulators (which isn't often)).
NRC Chairman Richard "Rich Rad" Meserve is the #1 lawyer for the Nuclear Mafia. He backs them in everything they do, and his staff (that is, the rest of the NRC) works diligently to support him. There is ZERO honesty at the NRC. All truths they tell are told only for the sake of convenience -- if a lie were in any way more convenient for them (in their warped view of the world) they would tell the lie instead.
One thing Meserve is right about (for convenience, of course!) is that increased security has its own risks. He speaks of it very carefully, skirting the main issue as only a lawyer can do, which is this: If you put a lot of weaponry near a nuke plant, you greatly increase the chances that there will be an accidental incident, and you also increase the chances that some nutcase, whom you've given powerful weapons to, will turn them against the plant. A pilot stole an A-10 Warthog attack plane a few years ago, and flew it for hundreds of miles, then eventually crashed it into a mountain. He was carrying live 500 lb. bombs at the time.
So, heightened security isn't much of an answer. This is why, by the way, the nuke industry loved Paul Levanthal when he appeared on T.V. over and over after 9-11. His oft-repeated suggestion for anti-aircraft guns around the nuke plants has many problems, including friendly-fire on our own civilian airplanes (a hundred such incidents would actually be well worth it if even one of them stops a meltdown!). The nuke industry realizes Ack Ack guns (aka, "Triple A") are not a very logical solution, and Levanthal wouldn't call for the plants to be shut down instead, so they loved him, way out in left field like that.
You would need bunkers to be built so that the plant itself cannot be fired on by the plant's own defenders. Obviously, from that consideration, the best place for such a bunker is RIGHT ON TOP OF THE CONTAINMENT DOME! But if there are two domes, you would have to make sure they can't shoot at each other's dome. Spent fuel pools need protection, control rooms, etc. etc. etc.. And moving all that ammo around near the plant isn't entirely safe, either! One need only recall some of the horrific explosions of ammunition during handling during WWII (hundreds died on one incident alone, for instance).
So if we can't protect them, and couldn't afford to, even if we could figure out a proper method, then it seems to me that shutting the plants down is the only logical alternative.
Cost-effectively protecting the huge, operational power plants is impossible. Protecting JUST a spent fuel pool is much, much easier, per dollar. Still, ultimately, impossible -- but you can do a lot more for the same, say, billion dollars than you can trying to protect something screaming along at a million gallons a minute, 2200 PSI, and 666 degrees F (or thereabouts). Protecting such a shaky machine at all costs is going to cost us.
Regards,
Russell Hoffman
Carlsbad, CA
For a "sneak peak" at a pictorial history of nuclear power, please visit my NEW web site (a work-in-progress): THE DEMON HOT ATOM: THE INTERNET GLOSSARY OF NUCLEAR TERMINOLOGY by Russell Hoffman and Friends:
http://www.animatedsoftware.com/hotwords/index.htm
=====================================================
At 10:05 AM 7/16/02 , "Bob Nichols" <bobnichols@cox.net> wrote:
To: "Russell D. Hoffman" <rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com>
Subject: [abolition-caucus] Lobbying Needed Re NPP, DOE Security
Russell,
Have you seen this proposal.
This federalized security is all well and good. But, and a big ole' "but" goes here. We need to fix this bill so that the nuke power plants PAY for the federalized security. No more subsidies for nukes. Repeal the ones they have. Let them compete in a deregulated market with dirt burning plants!
Bob
Friends,
Please call and/or fax your
Senators and Reps at: 202-224-3121 Fax#s available
by calling their offices or often at:
http://www.senate.gov and tell them to sign onto
this legislation to federalize security at
commercial nuclear power plants. Also please tell
them that commercial nuclear power must be stopped
permenantly as soon as possible. Most of the time
that can be done now. DOE nuclear weapons sites
also need to be federalized: http://www.pogo.org
Every one of your calls or faxes matters.
-Bill Smirnow
Today's National News relates to the Friends of
the Coast MY Security initiative. Friends of the
Coast PR package sent out yesterday.
Ray Shadis, FOTC
Sent: Tuesday, July 16, 2002 9:32 AM
Subject: FYI: Nuclear Safety Plan Seeks U.S.
Oversight of Power Plants
Nuclear Safety Plan Seeks U.S. Oversight of Power
Plants
Chicago Tribune - July 12, 2002
http://hsweb01.screamingmedia.com/PMA/pma_newsarti
cle1_krt.htm?SMDOCID=knightridder_2002_07_12_krtbn
_0000-0380-TB-NUKE-SAFETY&SMContentSet=0
Michael Kilian
Jul. 12--WASHINGTON -- A Senate proposal to
federalize security at nuclear power plants in the
wake of the Sept. 11 attacks is pitting the
nuclear industry and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission against Senate Democrats, who say
protection against terrorist assaults is woefully
lacking at the nation's 104 licensed nuclear power
facilities.
A group of senators led by Sen. Harry Reid
(D-Nev.) has introduced a bill to make the guards
who patrol nuclear power plants and the security
measures taken to protect them the responsibility
of federal authorities, just as the government is
taking over security at airports.
Democrats also have proposed making the test raids
conducted at nuclear power plants more realistic.
Action on these measures is expected before the
August congressional recess, and they face fierce
resistance from federal and industry officials who
contend that nuclear plant security is more than
adequate and that the changes would create another
bureaucracy.
The legislation's sponsors warn that without
dramatic new steps, the United States could be
vulnerable to terrorist attacks that might result
in "dirty bomb" detonations, and perhaps even the
deadly kind of disaster the former Soviet Union
experienced in the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
"Nearly half the nuclear power plants in this
country failed a recent mock-terrorist attack,
despite six months' advance warning," Reid said.
"When half our nuclear plants are failing their
security evaluations, we need to do more than
update the curriculum. We need a whole new
system."
But Richard Meserve, chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, argues that the Reid
measure would create a large new bureaucracy and
diffuse lines of authority and communication,
interfering with a quick response in the event of
an actual attack.
Though he declined to reveal details, Meserve said
the NRC has greatly strengthened defenses at the
power plants and adopted new ways of dealing with
the terrorist threat.
"We have significantly augmented the security," he
said in an interview at his headquarters in
Rockville, Md. "We have sent security experts out
to visit the plants throughout the country.
We've added all these measures to increase the
security. We've made assessments to make sure the
licensees are taking the appropriate steps."
The debate is especially important for Illinois,
which has more commercial nuclear power plants
than any other state.
The threat to nuclear power plants could come from
several directions, experts say. Though nuclear
reactors and spent radioactive fuel deposits are
protected in hardened concrete structures, they
are not invulnerable to the kind of aerial assault
that brought down the World Trade Center towers.
"No existing nuclear facilities were specifically
designed to withstand a deliberate, high-velocity,
direct impact of a large commercial airliner,"
Meserve told Congress.
More than half the nuclear generating reactors in
the U.S. are near metropolitan areas, including
two close to Washington and two just upriver from
New York City. In Illinois, the Braidwood plant is
near Joliet and the Byron plant is outside
Rockford.
Reid's bill calls for the NRC to move within 90
days to create a federal Nuclear Security Force
with nationwide personnel standards, including a
criminal and security background check and an
annual review of every guard. The federal
government would take over the training of nuclear
plant security guards and charge the power
companies a fee for doing so.
The measure also calls for creation of a 20-member
"mock terrorist team," similar to teams used in
the U.S. armed forces, that would specialize in
testing nuclear plant security on a more serious
and realistic basis than is currently done.
This would include exercises involving mock
attempts to strike power plants with hijacked
airliners, multiple attacks by teams of intruders,
attacks assisted by several "inside" employees in
league with the terrorists, assaults by air and
sea, and attacks in which the intruders have a
sophisticated knowledge of nuclear reactor and
power plant operations.
Major sponsors of the Reid bill include Sen. Jim
Jeffords (I-Vt.), chairman of the Environment and
Public Works Committee; Sen. Joseph Lieberman
(D-Conn.); and Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton
(D-N.Y.).
Current tests involve only "several" intruders and
one "insider."
Power plants are given advance notice of the mock
assaults, which can come from only one direction.
In statements made at NRC public hearings and to
members of Congress, security guards have
complained that the exercises designed to test
plants' ability to thwart a terrorist attack are
unrealistically easy, are held too infrequently
and do not deal with major threats.
According to a guard at a major New Jersey plant,
who asked to remain anonymous, the security staff
there trains only for a scenario of three
intruders coming over a single fence line, aided
by one person on the inside.
"At my plant that's all they train for, so if
anything else happens then everybody else is
dead," he said. "We're not allowed to have drills
for any other scenario."
Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.), who is among the
sponsors of the measure to sharpen the mock raids,
said this system must be overhauled.
"Before Sept. 11th, there was a low level of
threat that plants had to be protected
against--and the plants were flunking those exams
at the rate of 40 to 50 percent," Markey said. Yet
since the Sept. 11 attacks, he added, "the NRC has
refused to begin a new rulemaking [process] that
would change the threat against which a plant
would have to be protected."
The industry and its defenders said the mock raids
have been highly successful, pointing out areas
where security can be improved at various plants.
Meserve acknowledged that the threat scenario in
the practice exercises has not changed since Sept.
11, but he said change will come "in consultation
with the FBI and the intelligence community."
Meserve also defended the practice of informing
security staff beforehand of a mock attack.
Because the guards are armed, he said, a surprise
drill could result in death or injury.
He said that no mock attacks have been conducted
at the plants since Sept. 11 but that they will
resume soon.
"Commercial nuclear power plants are the most
well-protected industrial facilities in the United
States today," said Jack Skolds, chief nuclear
officer for Exelon Nuclear, which operates six
nuclear power plants in Illinois. "Many businesses
are turning to the nuclear industry as a model for
providing security and emergency planning at their
industrial complexes."
Critics also say nuclear plants should be guarded
by a professional federal security force for much
the same reason airports are to be protected this
way: Plant operators have an incentive to keep
their costs low by hiring inexperienced, poorly
trained guards.
But Meserve said such a force is unnecessary. "It
would add 5,000 new personnel to our 2,800
employees," he said. "We don't want to grow
bigger. We don't want to triple our budget."
Meserve also complained that having a federal
security force assigned to a component of private
industry would lead to command problems in an
emergency. Who would issue the orders, he asked,
the force's commanders or company executives?
Some industry critics concede that the nation's
nuclear power plants are generally in compliance
with NRC rules, but claim that those rules are so
lax as to create a clear and present danger.
"Performance tests repeatedly reveal that despite
this compliance with requirements, physical
security and the guard forces cannot stop
terrorists from causing catastrophic damage to the
reactor," Danielle Brian, executive director of
the watchdog group Project On Government
Oversight, told the Environment and Public Works
Committee in hearings last month.
Simply by breaking into a nuclear power plant and
laying hands on nuclear material, terrorists could
wreak havoc--and a national panic, critics say.
The Council on Foreign Relations said in a recent
paper, "The danger . . . is that attackers could
cause a meltdown or a fire or set off a major
conventional explosion, all of which could spew
radiation into nearby cities and towns."
The U.S. relies on nuclear power for 20 percent of
its electricity.
But more than half of Illinois' electrical power
is generated by its 11 nuclear reactors--the
largest concentration of nuclear plants in the
country. In comparison, Pennsylvania has nine
nuclear power plants and New York just six.
Immediately after Sept. 11, nuclear plants were
protected by Air Force and Air National Guard
fighters. These patrols have since been scaled
back, prompting calls for anti-aircraft guns and
surface-to-air missiles at nuclear sites. The NRC
objects, saying that the proper response to the
aerial threat lies in strengthening airport and
airline security.
All nuclear plants require water for cooling and
are located along waterways. After the Sept. 11
attacks, the Coast Guard rushed resources to
defend water approaches to the facilities. But
with all the other demands placed on the agency in
the terrorism crisis, that presence could not be
maintained.
Truck and car bombs are another worry. In 1993, a
vehicle crashed through the security fences of
Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island plant. The
mentally disturbed driver was arrested, but the
NRC moved quickly to adopt standards requiring new
protections against possible truck bomb attacks.
"But even before Sept. 11, those standards were
criticized as being too weak," said Stanford
University professor George Bunn, a former U.S.
non-proliferation treaty negotiator.
Still another serious threat is a commando-style
terrorist raid.
"These reactors have the spent fuel pools above
ground," said Brian, of the Project on Government
Oversight. "In these cases, a certain kind of
explosive could even be launched from outside the
fence line into the side of the pool."
If that happened, she added, the pool could start
draining immediately and release high levels of
radiation, quickly turning into an uncontrolled
radioactive fire.
If they got past the guards, terrorist commandos
would be able to access reactors and fuel piles,
said the New Jersey security guard who testified
confidentially before Congress.
"They can get to all of that if they take out the
guards, which wouldn't be hard," he said. "Their
object would be to trip the reactor or blow the
spent fuel pools. There are a hundred ways to trip
the reactor."
Skolds, of Exelon Nuclear, said the critics are
being unduly alarmist. Those who run nuclear
plants have as great an incentive as anyone to
make sure they are safe, he said.
"The nuclear power industry is absolutely
committed to ensuring that our plants are operated
safely and that all necessary steps are taken to
protect the health and safety of the public and
our employees," Skolds said.
He said new steps recently taken by the industry
include additional guards, increased patrolling,
more powerful weapons, added defenses against
water-borne attacks and expanded "stand off"
distances for vehicles as a protection against car
and truck bombs.
In fact, security at nuclear power plants is so
good that they may not be a high priority for
terrorists, Meserve said.
"We are not aware of any specific, credible plots
directed at nuclear plants since Sept. 11," he
said. "We've had a few scares but, in evaluation,
no specific, credible threats."
Congressional Democrats, however, intend to keep
pressuring for change.
"History tells us that these terrorists will
attempt to attack again," Markey said. "We know
that the nuclear power plants are at the top of
the [target] list. We have enough time to put in
place the protections that could make their
chances of success very small."
-----
To see more of the Chicago Tribune, or to
subscribe to the newspaper, go to
http://www.chicago.tribune.com/
(c) 2002, Chicago Tribune. Distributed by Knight
Ridder/Tribune Business News.
=========================================================