From: "Russell D. Hoffman" rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com
Subject: RE: Why haven't you closed down SONGS? (followup questions)
Cc: California Senators, governor of California, "Clanon, Paul"
References:
To:
Alok Kumar
State of California
Utilities Safety Branch
505 Van Ness Ave.
San Francisco, CA 94102
From:
Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA
Subject: RE: Why haven't you closed down SONGS? (followup questions)
Date: April 12th, 2001
Dear Sir,
Thank you for your letter (shown below, with prior correspondence). I would like to know the exact statute, law, executive order, or whatever it is that causes you to say that California PUC has no "direct jurisdiction" over San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). If California has any jurisdiction at all, I would think it would be jurisdiction over safety issues.
What I'm claiming is that the federal government's representatives (inspectors at the plant and everyone who supports them at DoE) are incapable of properly overseeing the safety of the plant, for one reason or another (understaffed, incompetent, an impossible task to begin with, or all three). In that case, wouldn't jurisdiction then go to California? If not at the state level, where would jurisdiction be taken up?
And if the whole idea of using nuclear power to solve California's energy problems is a scam brought about by a 50-year history of corruption and incompetence at the federal level (and I do so charge!) then wouldn't jurisdiction, once again, switch to California so that we can protect ourselves? If the State won't protect us when the Feds fail to do so, who will?
So please, give me a more thorough explanation of why California has no jurisdiction here. I contend that it does, and that it had better take action immediately, before a genocidal crime against humanity occurs, through maleficence at either the Federal or the private levels, or both, such as it appears might have already happened in this case (either at the plant or at the circuit breaker manufacturer, or both). These plants constantly are, essentially, just barely averting disaster on a daily, minute-by-minute basis, hoping nothing serious goes wrong -- or at least nothing they can't cover up and ignore. But serious accidents can occur because of equipment failures, incompetent and/or poorly trained operators, design faults, earthquakes, tsunamis, terrorists, airplanes crashing into the plant (by terrorists or by accident), even asteroids -- there are many ways. DoE essentially ignores every one of them. And insurance won't cover any of them.
If the entire federal Department of Energy operation is essentially corrupt or at the very least utterly incompetent, or both, then who takes over?
My guess would be the State of California, your branch, specifically. And is the DoE corrupt? Let me cite some statements by others. These are taken from a list compiled by:
John P. Shannon, Major USMC (Retired)
Thirty Year General Electric Company Employee at KAPL
Nuclear Physicist/Nuclear Engineer
Former Manager of Nuclear Safety
Industrial Safety/Industrial Hygiene
at the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory
262 Jones Road
Saratoga Springs, NY 12866
518-587-3245
A few of these quotes refer specifically to problems at KAPL (located in New York State) and with the Nuclear Navy. Need I mention that America's Nuclear Navy also, in my opinion, can and should -- and must -- be regulated by the State of California (at least when its ships and subs are in or near ports here), specifically because the feds won't do it?
Rep. Al Swift (D, Wash) "There isn't any basis to trust them (the DOE) at all."
Sen. John Glenn (D, Ohio) "We (the DOE) are poisoning our people in the name of national security."
Rep. Thomas Luken (D, Ohio) "We've had 30 years of conspiracy, condoning of criminality and cover-up. The same thing going on at Rocky Flats is common elsewhere. You've had the government (the DOE) brazenly and crassly (saying), "Go ahead and commit the crimes; forget about the local residents."
Rep. John D. Dingell (D, Mich.) "The DOE and DOD are among the most notorious offenders of our hazardous waste laws."
Richard Celeste (Governor, Ohio) "They (the DOE) have lied to us. Without a mechanism to oversee what they're doing, we can't trust them. The cost of cleaning up Fernald is not a discretionary budget item. After 37 years of service, the citizens of Ohio ... and of our nation ... deserve better than this."
Anthony Celebrezze (Att. Gen. Ohio) "During the Reagan Administration, the Justice Department kept throwing up road blocks. It slowed the process of getting Federal facilities cleaned up."
Rep. David Skaggs (D, Colo.) "It is unprecedented to have a battalion of FBI agents to descend on a Federal (DOE) facility to conduct an investigation of alleged violations of important environmental laws. The only implication that comes out of an action of this scale is that Federal authorities were concerned about the destruction of evidence."
Dan Reicher (NRDC) "This (FBI action) will send a shock wave through the nuclear weapons complex. It will cut to the heart of the problem, which has always been accountability."
Rep. Mike Synar (D, Okla.) "Currently, the department is not in control of its own defense complex. DOE is, in effect, a captive of its own contractors."
Dennis Eckart (D, Ohio) "The size of the vote indicates clearly that those who want to adopt a let's wait and see attitude about cleaning up the Federal (DOE) facilities have little standing in Congress."
Roy Romer (Gov. Colo.) "I will insist on much stricter state controls at the plant ... and if the Federal government balks, I may shut the plant as a health hazard. All of us cannot become the dump of last resort for the Department of Energy."
Hazel O'Leary (former Secretary of Energy) "Workers who expose flaws at nuclear weapons plants and labs regularly are harassed and undermined by their bosses. There has been a practice of repeated and long-term reprisal that visits (a whistle-blower) in the place he or she is most vulnerable ... by questioning the employee's competence."
Judge Loren N. Brown "Kakretz's present absolute denial of having called Bordell an evil man is not persuasive Uncertainty under oath at the deposition has become more certain under oath in the affidavit supporting a motion to dismiss. Under the circumstances, what he says in support of this motion lacks credibility." (A. Kakretz, a General Electric Employee, was the KAPL General Manager for 14 years.)
Tom Carpenter ( Attorney Government Accountability Project): "It emerges quite clearly that SNR's priorities lie in protecting GE's economic considerations at the expense of the health and safety of KAPL workers."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "responses to virtually all complaints are usually in the form of non-responses, e.g. "there is no evidence...", "...there is no unsafe condition...", "...management will investigate further...". Responses such as these are clearly inappropriate particularly when related to asbestos concerns."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project ): "The Saratogian newspaper quoted Mr. Sabian as saying that no problems had been found related to that complaint. You state that an investigation of the incident has yet to be completed. This lack of candor further reduces worker confidence."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "It took two years from the time of his complaint to obtain an asbestos abatement plan. I would furthermore not consider a conclusory three-sentence statement which lacks appropriate details, to be an abatement plan in any meaningful sense."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "Attachments indicate a tangled asbestos mess for which, until the GAO investigation was announced, neither GE nor DOE management has given much more than lip service."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): " a request for approval of a course of action to alleviate the asbestos problems then plaguing KAPL, clearly acknowledges that 4,000 feet of pipeline covering needs repair since weather conditions had severely reduced its effectiveness. Furthermore, G. Terranova {KAPL Employee Relations] states that "[t]hese areas must be repaired to prevent a release of asbestos fibers."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "These largely baseless responses routinely deny any violation of Occupational Safety & Health Standards or health and safety provisions found in their respective Articles of the IUE/GE National Contract. The documentation belies the KAPL myth, perpetuated by your letter, that management acts responsibly to correct egregious and potentially life-threatening concerns brought to light through union grievances."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "This grievance alleged loose surface contamination on top of the cell, unstable duct work, and high radiation levels from some sections of the duct work. A reading of 24,000 picocuries per 100/[square-cm] was well in excess of the allowable limits. KAPL management was aware of the situation. However, three months passed before SNR responded that "[t]here is no evidence that any KAPL employee has been exposed to an unsafe condition...[nor that] KAPL's radiological controls practices are inadequate for radiological work on top of Radioactive Material Laboratory [R. M. L.] cell #10. One could have just as easily said that there is no evidence that employees were not exposed to the high radiation levels on Cell 10 - - assuming it does not make it so. Prudent radiological practice mandates that conditions described in the union's grievance be rectified so as to eliminate the possibility of an exposure."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "Several complaints concerning improper handling of radioactive materials were highlighted in 1985. Responses from management were typically devoid of both detail and of timeliness which the nature of the allegations demanded."
Tom Carpenter (Attorney Government Accountability Project): "The niggling responses of GE and SNR management to legitimate safety and health concerns demonstrates the elevation of production concerns at the expense of worker and public health and safety."
Doug Allen (IUE-AE Business Agent): "There seems to be no mention in their (GAO) report for procedures for my carpenters, who have cut threw transite walls with skill saws to make door openings or window openings, or to replace broken transite wall panels, or cutting cemesta board for walls; a large amount of this work was done in closed shops or offices, in which it looked like it was snowing while performing this work - with no air sampling being done, no monitoring, no procedures, no protection, whatsoever, no training, no qualifications for this work, and no requirements for respirators until approximately 1989, and no protection for the office workers while this work was being performed."
Doug Allen (IUE Local 301 AE Business Agent): "I find it most interesting that a similar incident occurred in 1990 while your (GAO) investigators were here. In the DIG Plant, they had the Navy remove lagging from some piping in which they were told it was non-asbestos, so they took no precautions other than to wear surgical masks, then proceeded to rip it down, stuff the asbestos in garbage bags, then dragged the garbage bags through the hallways of Building 13, and then threw the garbage bags in the regular garbage dumpster. So, why was this incident not mentioned in their (the GAO) report?"
Doug Allen (IUE Local 301 AE Business Agent): "Mr. Synar, if their controls have been so great and there has been no other incidents, maybe someone can explain how the following people (an attached list of 150 workers) contacted Asbestos related Cancer and have past away or have developed asbestosus [sic] (a lung disease). But I see no mention of any of this in their (the GAO) report and the list will probably continue to grow, but we are safe - no problem - your investigators say so!"
Doug Allen (IUE Local 301 AE Business Agent): "I would like to discuss some of the radiological information we provided to your investigators - such as going into radiation areas and putting film badges in lead boxes so it doesn't show a dose rate. Most of this information was in documents given to the GAO or from interviews they held. Also, they were informed of the KAPL Landfill and the buried drums with radiation symbols. I even offered, Mr. Synar, to volunteer my own time, if the Government would provide the heavy equipment to dig up the Landfill to prove or disprove, if the contaminated drums were buried there but nobody wanted to hear about it. "
Doug Allen (IUE Local 301 AE Business Agent): "Mr. Sinar, [sic] I would like to say on behalf of myself and my members, that the employees who have worked in these facilities in the past and the spouses who have lost loved ones from exposure to hazardous material from these facilities is that - We know better, Sir! we would like to thank your investigative branch the GAO, especially those individuals who did the investigation and all of the experts they brought in for us to talk to, which we never saw much less got to talk to, and who looked into our allegations - it was deeply appreciated and we all feel much safer and healthier since the 52 page report has been released, and we could read for ourselves that Naval Reactors still carries the Seal of Excellence ."
Wenonah Hauter (Director of Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project) "The NRC has ignored these important safety issues for decades. If these nuclear reactors don't meet safety requirements, they should be shut down until they do."
Washington Monthly magazine "The DOE's nuclear weapons complex had deteriorated for 30 years before the GAO noticed."
Rep Richard Armey (R, TX) "The first recipient of the Mark Twain Statistical Distortion Award is the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress. It's the Mark Twain award, because there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."
Harold L. Ryan (Senior United States District Judge ) "DOE (Naval Reactors) simply does not seem to understand that this nation is depending on it to protect the health and safety of all Americans from the danger associated with its activities."
Harold L. Ryan (Senior United States District Judge ) "...the court denied DOE's Motion because DOE had made serious misrepresentations to the court. When the court learned of these developments, it was dismayed by DOE's apparent bad faith in its representations to the court. Consequently, the court was unmoved by DOE's promise of future compliance."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "I was Screwed, blued and tattooed, which I am convinced was the work of political enemies. This is what happens to whistle-blowers who speak truth to power in the Clinton administration. I was hounded out of the department (the DOE) for my efforts to expose Chinese nuclear spying."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "My judgment on intelligence was questioned by an inspector general' s report that went to great lengths to coverup the entire Chinese espionage debacle."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "Their responses (DOE superiors) were always "appropriate," but their actions never matched their expressions of concern."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "To his credit, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson did present me with a $10,000 bonus, but this didn't offset the fact that I had been demoted, relegated to a meaningless job and eventually forced out of the department. Routine stuff for whistle-blowers in this administration."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "I read that I was a 'dangerous demagogue,' a 'great impostor,' 'obsessed,' that my 'style' was abrasive and a host of other epithets including imputations of racism and xenophobia. This was pretty heavy stuff for someone who has spent most of his career trying to stay out of the public eye."
Notra Trulock (former Chief of Counterintelligence at the Energy Department) "Of course, most of these allegations came from the very officials within DOE and the White House responsible for the cover-ups and stonewalling of the Congress, and who had fought so hard to kill any meaningful security reform at the labs. Many of these were the perpetrators, if not the creators, of the very security lapses that made Chinese espionage possible in the first place."
Congressional Report (Staff members of the House Commerce Committee's Republican majority) "The U.S. Department of Energy has "squandered hundreds of millions of dollars" since the end of the Cold War trying to develop innovative technologies for cleaning up the nation's contaminated nuclear weapons sites."
Harold L. Ryan (Senior United States District Judge ) "Idaho has submitted an internal DOE memorandum which suggests that DOE never intended to reprocess the (naval) fuel, but simply used that as an excuse to send it to INEL for indefinite storage."
As Mr. Shannon puts it to the person at DoE whom he recently sent the list to (I obtained a copy directly from Mr. Shannon), you "must find this criticism and condemnation of the DOE, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and the General Accounting Office appalling".
If so, isn't it your job to do something about it for the safety of California's 30 million citizens?
Thank you again for your prior response, and I have taken the liberty of forwarding these comments to the addresses you gave me.
Sincerely,
Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, California
======================================================
Attachments (2):
(1) Quotes from "As The Turbine Turns" (Southern California Edison employee newsletter), April 9th, 2001 (obtained today).
(2) Previous correspondence.
======================================================
From "As The Turbine Turns", Page 1 article titled "Unit 3 Root Cause Report Released":
"Despite an extensive forensic investigation, according to the report, the root cause for the malfunction of the 3A0712 feeder breaker from the unit auxiliary transformer cannot be determined."
In that case, shouldn't the plant be shut down because they can't figure out how it operates in the first place? Although the root cause of the malfunction could not be determined, the report offers many possible explanations:
"The improper pressure or resistance at the main contacts of the breaker may have been caused by improper bridge pivot pressure or slippage of the adjusting stud in the pushrod threaded insert. Though less credible, foreign material between the breaker contacts may also have caused the problem."
In other words, unnoticed aging, poorly designed parts, improper adjustments, or even purposeful sabotage could all be root causes.
No mention is made in the article about the larger design faults which would allow an explosive circuit breaker failure, something that obviously should be expected to happen now and then, to cause so many costly secondary failures as happened here. These design problems are presumably endemic to the industry.
Regarding these secondary failures, including the (always very dangerous) loss of offsite power, the article states:
"Failure of the main turbine DC lube oil pump motor breaker appears to have been the result of a damaged trip mechanism caused by incorrect rotation of the adjustment knob."
But they couldn't determine when the knob was incorrectly adjusted, which means they couldn't determine WHO incorrectly adjusted it and WHO failed to notice it was incorrectly adjusted. That indicates, obviously, they aren't paying close enough attention.
And they similarly couldn't determine WHO might have last adjusted the "Phase C adjustment knob" which was, according to the article, only "loosely connected to the cam linkage mechanism". You'd think someone would have noticed, since, according to the Root Cause Report quoted in the article, "the adjustment knobs would have little or no effect on spring tension, and, consequently, little or no effect on the trip setpoint." One tends to think that such a knob would not have felt right to anyone used to turning such knobs.
Taken together, this is all indisputable evidence that multiple "unexpected" failures are actually the norm at San Onofre, where one circuit breaker failure can cause numerous serious and expensive additional problems in fractions of a second. It's time to realize that nuclear energy is unreliable, expensive and extremely dangerous, and we need to get down to the business of building a renewable energy production and delivery system for California so that we are not at the mercy of such gross incompetence.
And we need to stop trusting the DoE to be watching out for us. They are clearly not doing their job, and furthermore are incapable of realizing they have failed.
-- rdh
====================================================
At 10:01 AM 4/12/01 -0700, "Kumar, Alok"
Dear Mr. Hoffman
I am however, forwarding your note to more knowledgeable persons within CPUC who may provide you further guidance on safety and environmental issues mentioned in your note.
Thank you for contacting Utilities Safety Branch of CPUC.
Alok Kumar
-----Original Message-----
To:
From:
Date: April 11th, 2001
Subject: Why haven't you closed down SONGS?
To Whom It May Concern,
Enclosed (below) is a letter I sent to the federal Department of Energy
regarding the fire at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (aka SONGS)
which occurred February 3rd, 2001. My understanding is that it was more
like a "small" explosion and then a fire.
I have yet to hear anything from any report or official about what (if any)
outside factor might have caused the circuit breaker to have blown in the
first place. What load on the line (if any) was responsible for the circuit
breaker failure, and what is being done to ensure that explosive circuit
breaker failures will not occur again, with possibly even more significant
consequences?
Also, in light of all the other various nuke "incidents" over the years,
which have added up to hundreds if not thousands of close calls and
numerous radioactive releases (always deemed "too small to worry about",
but have you added them all up and seen if THAT number is still "too small
to worry about"?), and in light of the "new" general understanding of the
incredible hazard radioactive particles represent in our environment, down
to the smallest size (the health effects -- cancer, leukemia, birth
defects, etc. remain unchanged in their severity, only their rate goes up
or down within a population depending on the dose), and in light of the
fact that there isn't, hasn't been in 50 years of trying, and as far as
scientists can tell, won't ever be, a safe long-term storage system for
high-level nuclear waste (or low-level, for that matter, which is just
diluted high-level waste), my question is this: Why isn't California
switching to clean, reliable, abundant, cheaper, renewable energy
resources? Such energy sources as Wind, Wave, Tide, Solar, Geothermal,
Hydroelectric, Biomass, and so on are far safer, which, it would seem to
me, is a safety issue when comparing our energy source choices. We need to
quickly switch to a mix of all of those I've just mentioned, while
immediately shutting down the nuclear power plants and phasing out the coal
plants, then the oil plants, and finally even the natural gas plants. Why
aren't we doing this, from a safety standpoint?
What's the excuse for riding the nuclear demon train until it wrecks, and
ruins our ecosystem, destroys tourism, and costs us our lives and our way
of life?
These are questions every citizen should be asking of our State officials
at this time. Changes are obviously needed; decisions need to be made
which will affect the future of California for decades or even centuries to
come -- if we make the right choices, and for millennia to come (and hell
to pay) if we make the wrong ones. Let's work together to make the right
choices, and not bow in to pressure from the Nuclear Mafia in favor of
their Demon Hot Atom.
Thank you in advance for your concern,
Sincerely,
Russell Hoffman
Attachment: Previous letter to DOE about the San Onofre Feb. 3rd fire
(contains comment sent to the local (North County (San Diego)) paper):
==============================================
To Whom It May Concern:
I have attached a letter I wrote to the local paper regarding an accident
February 3rd, 2001 at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
I would like all documentation on the failure of circuit breakers at any
nuclear power plant in the United States, and all documentation on
accidents involving electrical circuitry at San Onofre Nuclear Generating
Station (SONGS) specifically, including Units 1, 2, and 3.
I am entitled to this information as a concerned citizen of the United
States and a local resident. I am questioning the capabilities of the
resident inspectors at San Onofre, and of the operators of the facility,
and of the equipment, and of the Agency.
Thank you in advance.
Sincerely,
Russell Hoffman
From:
Subject: Safety at San Onofre seriously misrepresented by NCT
Date: April 8th, 2001,
To The Editor:
It is impossible, in the amount of space you give your reader's, to
describe, paragraph by paragraph, all the misrepresentations in your
front-page-center article in today's paper, written by the
always-biased-for-nukes Phil Diehl (is he paid by the nuclear industry or
does he just have a cushy job waiting for him when he leaves the NCT?). I
thought newspaper reports were supposed to be balanced. But what other
industry would get such kid-glove treatment as SONGS gets in "Inspector
Tracks Safety At San Onofre"?
The article describes as "small" a fire which caused "tens of millions" of
dollars damage, blazed for nearly three hours, and knocked out power at
Unit III from February 3rd until at least mid-June, a fire which started
just 12 hours after the power plant was brought back online after a
month-long refueling outage -- which was rushed to completion in 32 days
rather than the normal 40 days. Downtime costs about two million dollars
every three days in lost revenue for SDG&E and the other shareholders. And
rolling blackouts cause numerous businesses to suffer financial burdens
which SDG&E will never compensate them for.
The fire started, according to the article, when a circuit breaker "failed
suddenly. It sent sparks and bits of hot metal flying..."
This is serious! There are hundreds if not thousands of circuit breakers
at San Onofre. Huge ones. Old ones. The inspectors featured in the
article, James Sloan Jr. and his partner John Kramer, somehow missed the
fact that one was going to "suddenly" fail.
This situation could only come about in one of two ways:
One is that the circuit breaker was obviously showing signs of fault but no
one noticed.
If this is the case then the safety procedures at San Onofre are clearly
grossly inadequate. Either the inspectors should be fired, or additional
numbers of inspectors are needed, or more likely, both. And some SDG&E
workers weren't doing their job (inspectors are supposed to be inspecting
working plants, not finding problems for the operators), so they should
likewise be fired, retrained, or more of them are needed to "safely"
operate the plant (something I don't think can be done in any case). And
obviously, if this could have been tracked down before the event, then at
this moment one would assume that ALL of the circuit breakers in the plant
were likewise inadequately maintained and inspected. In ALL units.
The other thing that could have happened is that there was absolutely no
way to know that this particular circuit breaker was going to fail, because
it showed no signs that it was suddenly going to send sparks flying every
which way.
But if that's the case, then clearly it can be expected that the entire
electrical wiring system at San Onofre is A) riddled with circuit breakers
which can fail unexpectedly, explosively, and potentially can cause
catastrophic consequences, and B) the entire wiring system is built with
its circuit breakers in such a way, and in such positions, that when they
fail explosively (which they obviously can do) they are capable of causing
a wide variety of secondary problems (which they obviously can do),
including but hardly limited to the problems caused at San Onofre,
specifically, damaging all three lubricating systems for the 200-ton
turbine, which undoubtedly was spinning at high speed at the time. This is
a very dangerous situation and we as a community are very lucky things
didn't get a lot worse than they did.
One can read old newspaper accounts about what happens when a large turbine
spins out of control. It can crash through just about anything. It can
damage other circuits, pumps, pipes, valves, compressors, anything it runs
into or over. This isn't so farfetched: That's why the turbine has three
lubricating systems. They aren't all supposed to fail at once, but they
did. 200 unlubricated spinning tons of weight on a couple of bearings get
awful hot awful fast. The bearings seize, the shaft or the bearings (or
both) crack, and the whole unit flies off like a whirling dervish. We
almost lost North County (and San Diego and Orange County, too). We were
lucky.
But Phil reports that safety is on track at San Onofre. Oh yeah? I don't
think so.
The hundred million dollars or more that this accident will probably cost
someone (insurance, ratepayers, government, probably everyone but SDG&E) is
just a small piece of all the money we've poured down the rathole called
nuclear energy.
It's time to switch to proven long-term renewable energy solutions,
including all of the following: Wind, Wave, Tide, Solar, Geothermal,
Hydroelectric and Biomass. It's time to build a worldwide power grid to
supply those renewable energy systems to the people, and it's time for Phil
Diehl to retire to work for the nuclear industry, where such self-serving
hype as he writes will always, no doubt, be welcome.
But he shouldn't write for a paper interested in balanced reporting.
Sincerely,
Russell Hoffman
Note: Inspector Sloan, according to the article, was going into a theater
when his beeper went off and he had to go to the plant because of the
fire. Yet as the fire raged, he took the time, according to the article,
to get a refund on his ticket (I wonder how he managed this, since movie
tickets invariably say "no refunds or exchanges") and to take his wife
home. It is interesting to note that he was apparently afraid to have his
wife come near the plant during the emergency.
===============================================
*************************************************
Thank you for letting us know about the problems at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Plant. Unfortunately, California PUC has no direct jurisdiction over nuclear power plants. You should forward your comments to the nuclear regulatory agencies.
From: Russell D. Hoffman [mailto:rhoffman@animatedsoftware.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 2:43 PM
To: alok.kumar@cpuc.ca.gov
Subject: Why haven't you closed down SONGS?
State of California
Utilities Safety Branch
505 Van Ness Ave.
San Francisco, CA 94102
Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA
Carlsbad, CA
===============================================
To:
Editor
North County Times
opinion@nctimes.com
cc:
pdiehl@nctimes.com
Russell D. Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, California
Carlsbad, California
April 8th, 2001
www.animatedsoftware.com/whoisrdh.htm
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** Carlsbad CA
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First posted April, 2001.
Last modified April, 2001.
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