California Coastal Commission Submission by Russell D. Hoffman June 13th, 2001

To: OSHA REGION IX
From: "Russell D. Hoffman"
Subject: CRANE ACCIDENT AT SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION JUNE 1ST, 2001
Cc:

To: OSHA Region IX
71 Stevenson Street, Room 420
San Francisco, California 94105

cc: U.S. Department of Labor
Occupational Safety & Health Administration
Office of Public Affairs - Room N3647
200 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20210

From: Russell D. Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, CA

Re: CRANE ACCIDENT AT SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION JUNE 1ST, 2001

Date: June 8th, 2001

To Whom It May Concern;

The attached report discusses an accident that occurred Friday, June 1st, 2001 at San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) involving a crane, a strap (or rather, not enough straps), a gantry, and "the usual gang of idiots" (Larry Doe, Moe Doe, and Curly Doe).  I contacted the Nuclear Regulator Commission (NRC) when I didn't see the incident show up on their daily reports for the nuclear power plant.  The NRC inspector I spoke to, Charles Marschall (817.860.8185), told me in a conversation on Monday, June 4th, 2001, that the reason the accident had not shown up on the reports was probably because it did not happen in the nuclear area.

This doesn't make any sense to me.  My understanding is that it was the same crew as might just as well be moving nuclear fuel, for one thing.  Secondly, they would almost surely be following the same manuals, and perhaps even using the same cranes, gantrys, straps, etc..  I am further told that it was a "very carefully planned move", the entire area was properly roped off, etc..  The "shrapnel pattern" was estimated as it's supposed to be.  Yet still the crane fell.

Mr. Marschall of the NRC, when I described my opinion to him on the matter, said that (somehow; he didn't explain how) tighter regulations would have prevented such an accident (dropped load from a broken strap) had they been moving nuclear fuel instead of another crane, which is what they were moving.  (I am paraphrasing his response because I did not record it.)

He assured me that all moves of nuclear fuel would be handled properly.  I find his assurances hollow, especially since he was not even interested, at least until prodded and then only casually, from a regulatory point of view, in investigating the matter, ON THE GROUNDS THAT SINCE IT DIDN'T INVOLVE NUCLEAR FUEL, IT PROBABLY WASN'T EVEN REPORTABLE TO THE NRC.

My emphasis, obviously.

What it means then, is that the NRC is not interested in the actual success rate, and the actual quality of the workers and their equipment, not just throughout the crane industry, but even specifically within one of the plant sites they license!  How can they possibly collect valid statistics, or properly determine that a licensee is operating within the bounds of safety, if they ONLY look at the nuclear-related activities of the operators of the nuclear power plant, and not at all the other aspects of their on-the-job performance?

Mr Marschall contends that, had they been moving nuclear fuel, they never would have dropped anything (so why worry?) because of tighter regulations and better controls and so forth.  If his contention is correct, then why aren't those wonderful and amazing regulations adopted throughout the crane industry?  A second question is, just because the NRC isn't interested in non-nuclear industrial accidents at their sites, which seems to be the case from what I can see, does that mean that the Department of Labor is reciprocally not interested in the nuclear-related accidents and violations wherever they might happen?  Can someone at OSHA confirm or deny whether nuclear-related incidents would be handled by OSHA, or do they divide the job site and ignore a significant portion of what happens there as well?

In other words, I contend that the NRC's disinterest in this particular accident indicates a systemic problem at the NRC -- they SHOULD be extremely interested in this accident, and an NRC inspector should be able to point me right to a particular NRC regulation which would somehow prevent such accidents, which are over-and-above any state or federal OSHA regulations for moving large loads.  If that's true, why hasn't OSHA adopted these better regulations?

In other words, I contend that the Department of Labor should investigate the Department of Energy for gross negligence, that negligence being specifically expressed in the form of routinely ignoring safety violations which should be of great concern to them.

In this particular instance, considering the widespread destruction that a nuclear fuel accident could cause, and considering that San Onofre had at least one additional crane safety violation as well, in 1997 (noted in more detail below), and a 100 million dollar fire in February of this year, and many other safety-related problems, I think fines would be insufficient for the licensee.  They must be required to shut the plant down.  The NRC also needs to be dismantled.  It covers too many steps and does not allow proper oversight, thus becoming so "ingrown" as to be unable to see outside it's own cocoon of activity.  They are unable to realize that a crane accident in their turbine building might affect the safety of the plant in a general sense (i.e., the plant is not operated safely) even if not in the specific sense (i.e., they were, thankfully, not moving nuclear fuel at the time).

Sincerely,

Russell Hoffman
Concerned Citizen
Carlsbad, California

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First posted June 13th, 2001.

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